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ASSURING ACCESS TO JUSTICE: THE ROLE OF
THE JUDGE IN ASSISTING PRO SE LITIGANTS IN
LITIGATING THEIR CASES IN NEW YORK CITY'S
HOUSING COURT

Paris R. Baldacci*
This paper' focuses on the problems faced by pro se litigants in
actually litigating, rather than settling their cases in New York City's
Housing Court ("Housing Court"),^ and the role of the court—particu
larly the role of judges—in assisting them in meeting these problems. It
does not attempt a detailed theoretical analysis of the problems underly
ing the plight of pro se litigants in Housing Court, or of the solutions
proposed here. Rather, its primary goal is to outline what has become
generally recognized to be the underlying problem facing pro se litigants
in most courts and particularly in New York City s Housing Court. I
examine this issue in Part I. Part II then sketches a number of models
and their theoretical bases by which that problem can be addressed. Ac* Paris R. Baldacci is a Clinical Professor of Law at the Benjamin N. Cardozo School of
Law. He has practiced in New York City's Housing Court since 1987. He was Chair of the
Committee on Housing Court of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York from 1996
to 1999, and a member of the Association's Committee on the Judiciary from 1996 to 2002.
He has lectured and written on issues affecting litigation in New York City s Housing Court,
particularly regarding succession rights to rent-regulated tenancies.
1 This paper is based on an earlier version prepared for the working conference: The Hous
ing Court in the 21st Century: Can It Better Address the Problems Before It?, October 29,
2004, New York County Lawyers Association, to serve as a basis for the discussions of the
"Adjudicative Process and the Role of the Court working group. The Report of that working
group - as well as those of other working groups - is also included in this issue of the Journal. I
am indebted to the insights generated by the working group and to its chair, Hon. Marcy
Friedman, who is currently a Justice of the Supreme Court of the State of New York and was
previously a Judge in the Housing Court of the Civil Court of the City of New York.
2 The Housing Part of the Civil Court of the City of New York was established in 1972 by
the passage of § 110 of the New York City Civil Court Act. See N.Y. CITY CIV. CT. ACT § 110
(1972). Subpart (a) provides:
A part of the court shall be devoted to actions and proceedings involving the enforce
ment of state and local laws for the establishment and maintenance of housing stan
dards, including, but not limited to, the multiple dwelling law and the housing
maintenance code, building code and health code of the administrative code of the
city of New York . . . .

Id.
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cordingiy, this paper is not intended to be a destination, but rather a
starting point.
However, I hope that this endeavor is more than just one more
article in a series that have identified the underlying problem and pro
posed solutions, with little impact on the day-to-day experience of pro se
litigants in New York City's Housing Court. Indeed, there is a depress
ing quality to reading the literature in this area. The plight of pro se
litigants in New York City's Housing Court and the broad outlines of
some solutions have been recognized for at least two decades.^ In addi
tion, numerous law review articles, judicial studies and reports have for
some time reached a remarkable level of consensus regarding the nature
of the problems faced by pro se litigants in our adversarial system in state
and federal courts in every part of the country.^
Nevertheless, conferences on meeting the challenge of the pro se
litigant (such as the one that gave rise to this paper) are convened, but
appear to be reinventing the wheel, unfamiliar with the previous re
search and analyses. They then issue reports which have little or no
effect. I hope that this paper and the conference reports published here
will not meet a similar fate. In addition, although the focus of this
article is on proposed reforms in New York City's Housing Court, I

3 See THE CITY WIDE TASK FORCE ON HOUSING COURT, 5 MINUTE JUSTICE OR "AIN'T
NOTHING GOING ON BUT THE RENT!" (1986); ACCESS TO JUSTICE PROJECT ADVISORY
COMM., ACLU, JUSTICE EVICTED (1987) [hereinafter JUSTICE EVICTED]; THE COMMITTEE ON
LEGAL ASSISTANCE, ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, HOUSING, COURT
PRO BONO PROJECT PART II: LAW REFORM (1988); THE COMM. ON LEGAL ASSISTANCE, AS
SOCIATION OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, PROPOSED LEGISLATION FOR NEW YORK
CITY HOUSING COURT REFORM (1989); Report on the Housing Court, NEW YORK COUNTY
COURT MONITORS (The Fund for Modern Courts, New York, N.Y.), Feb. 1994, at 51-57
[hereinafter New York County]; Report on the Housing Court, THE BRONX CITIZENS' COURT
MONITORING PROJECT, INC. (The Fund for Modern Courts, New York, N.Y.), Dec. 1993, at
41-46 [hereinafter Bronx]; Report on the Housing Court, THE BROOKLYN CITIZEN COURT
MONITORS (The Fund for Modern Courts, New York, N.Y.), Sept. 1993, at 43-48 [hereinafter

Brooklyn]; Report by Scott Stringer, New York State Assemblyman, The People Vs. DHCR &
HPD: The Case for Reforming Housing Court (May 1997) (on file with author); see generally
Russell Engler, And Justice for All - Including the Unrepresented Poor: Revisiting the Roles ofJudges,
Mediators, and Clerks, G7 FORDHAM L. REV. 1987 (1999) [hereinafter Engler]; PAULA
GALOWITZ, THE HOUSING GOURT'S ROLE IN MAINTAINING AFFORDABLE HOUSING, HOUS
ING AND COMMUNITY ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN NEW YORK CITY: FACING THE FUTURE
180 (Michael H. Schill, ed., 1999).
4 See, e.g., AMERICAN JUDICATURE SOCIETY, MEETING THE CHALLENGE OF PRO SE LITI
GATION: A REPORT AND GUIDEBOOK FORJUDGES AND COURT MANAGERS (1998) [hereinafter
MEETING THE CHALLENGE].
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would submit that the proposals outlined here may be applicable to
other courts in which pro se litigants predominate.
I.

THE PROBLEM

Although it is clear that most cases in Housing Court are settled,
particularly those involving pro se litigants, the fact is that in many in
stances, especially in holdovers, out of possession cases, warranty of habitability hearings, or motions/hearings to compel compliance with
orders to correct housing violations, a pro se litigant is thrust into the
role of litigator within an adversarial system which she does not under
stand, either procedurally or substantively, and which effectively silences
her.^
The preceding description and the analysis that follows are based
on a few working hypotheses which will be elaborated below;
1. Pro se litigants usually have only a very generalized understanding
regarding both the defenses and claims relevant to their cases and
regarding how to present those defenses or claims to a trier of fact.^
2. The fundamental problem for pro se litigants in having their de
fenses or claims heard is not primarily their lack of information or
understanding, but the structural dynamics in Housing Court
which work to silence the pro se litigant even when she has some
knowledge regarding defenses or claims.^
5 It is well-documented that pro se litigants in Housing Court are predominantly tenants.
See, e.g., GALOWITZ, supra note 3, at 181-82 (noting that according to a 1993 study only 11.9%
of tenants were represented). This figure has not changed significantly in the intervening years.
Telephone Interview with Hon. Fern Fisher, Administrative Judge of the Civil Court of the City
of New York (Mar. 3, 2005) (commenting that anecdotal evidence indicates that at most 15% of
tenants are represented). However, there are also a not insignificant number of pro se landlords,
particularly in the Housing Courts outside of Manhattan. Id. (noting that about 15% of land
lords, primarily in the boroughs outside of New York County, may be unrepresented). Accord
ingly, the comments presented here are applicable with some modification to the challenges
faced by pro se landlords.
® See MEETING THE CHALLENGE, supra note 4; see also Barbara Bezdek, Silence in the Court:
Participation and Subordination of Poor Tenants' Voices in Legal Process, 20 HOFSTRA L. REV. 533
(1992) [hereinafter Bezdek]; Engler, supra note 3, at 1987-92; RICHARD ZORZA, THE SELFHELP FRIENDLY COURT: DESIGNED FROM THE GROUND UP TO WORK FOR PEOPLE WITH
OUT LAWYERS 17-18 (2002) [hereinafter ZORZA]. See generally Jona Goldschmidt, The Pro Se

Litigant's Struggle for Access to Justice, 40 FAMILY CT. REV. 36 (2002) [hereinafter Litigant's
Struggle].
Z Bezdek, supra note 6, at 561-62 (finding tenants in Baltimore Rent Court lost to landlord
rent claims even when they had knowledge of or could prove defenses to those claims); id. at
591 (noting that poor tenants' relationship to law as one of subordination and not rights "ren
ders dubious proposals that information-delivery responses could remedy dysfunctional condi-
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The root cause of this systemic silencing may be, in part, a slavish
adherence to what is perceived to be the strictures of the adversarial
system, including the resulting notions of the appropriate role of
judges in such a system.®

Whatever may be the root causes of this systemic silencing, evi
dence of it is pervasive. In a seminal study of Baltimore's Rent Court,
Professor Barbara Bezdek found that even with an understanding of de
fenses and claims, including having received advice and, in some in
stances, papers prepared by attorneys to assist them, pro se litigants were
systematically silenced in that court. ^ Professor Bezdek identifies one
element as key in understanding this dynamic: the judicial process in
housing and other courts rejects both the form and substance of the
tions of the rent court s operation. ... In other words, knowledge of rights would not confer
power. Our experience in the courthouse suggests as much."); ZORZA, supra note 6, at 18
( practitioners report that whatever resources are put into [providing pro se litigants with] infor
mation, in the end many \pro se] litigants cannot be prepared to handle the courtroom with
information alone. ). But see Helen B. Kim, Legal Education for the Pro Se Litigant: A Step
Towards a Meaningful Right to Be Heard, 96 YALE L.J. 1641, 1642 (1987). "Experience has
shown that providing general legal information to pro se litigants can significantly increase their
chances of success both in court and in settlement negotiations." Id.
8 See, e.g.. Litigant's Struggle, supra note 6, at 41. Despite the modern trend toward a more
active role for judges,
adversary theory requires the judge to remain passive until the conclusion of the advo
cates presentations. He is not free to conduct an independent inquiry or otherwise
accelerate the pace of the proceedings . . . [this passivity is] to ensure that the trier will
remain neutral until he renders his decision . . . [and neutrality is to ensure] the
integrity of adversarial deliberations (quoting STEPHAN LANDSMAN, THE ADVERSARY
SYSTEM: A DESCRIPTION AND A DEFENSE 34 (1984)) (emphasis added);
see also Engler, supra note 3, at 2022-23.
The traditional notions of who should be giving legal advice, and what it means to be
impartial, were developed within the framework of the adversarial system. The adver
sarial system presumes that both sides will be represented by counsel .... The adver
sarial system purports to promote fairness and justice. Yet, the rules currently operate
as barriers preventing untepresented litigants from participating meaningfully in the
legal system and thereby frustrate the goal of dispensing fairness and justice. . . . One
important barrier is the narrow conception of impartiality that typically permeates the
discussions of the various roles [of the players in the system, including judges.]
Id.
^ Bezdek, supra note 6. It should be noted that although Professor Bezdek's documentation
and analysis focuses on Baltimore s Rent Court, the structural and systemic features she finds
there that silence pro se litigants are present in most judicial settings and, thus, her conclusions,
with some modification, are applicable to those settings as well. Id. at 533. See Engler, supra
note 3, at 2047-69 (finding similar features in Family and Bankruptcy courts, and in Boston and
New York City housing courts); see also Jane C. Murphy, Access to Legal Remedies: The Crisis in
Family Law, 8 BYU J. PUB. L. 123, 124-27 (1993) (showing the same is true in Family Court).
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inevitable manner in which pro se litigants speak, i.e., narrative. Indeed,
it is obvious that narrative is the way in which most people, except per
haps lawyers, speak.
In our observations, when invited [to say why they are in court], . . .
many tenants offer the court an explanation for their nonpayment.
The judge either waits through the story or interrupts it, but at either
point, tells the tenant that her remarks are irrelevant, and orders judg
ment for the landlord. This is the clash between the conventions for
talking about troubles in noninstitutional settings and the law's con
ventions for speech within legal institutions, which the judge learned
through formal education in law school and observation of other legal
professionals' courtroom behavior. . . .
. . . My point is that the judge is structuring the discourse by leading
the tenant into expression and then dismissing that which the judge
elicited. Doing so in this way is both misleading and destructive.
It is misleading, because the rule-oriented court talk expected and
privileged by judges in low-level courts bears little or no relation to
people's natural narratives. The rules of courtroom discourse are sel
dom explained to those witnesses expected to conform to them. . . .
Rules of evidence disallow the ordinary discourse rules used when peo
ple talk as they ordinarily do. . . . Judges, however, expect parties to
present their own case and abjure "acting as a party s advocate by
frankly eliciting storylines. ... As structured, [the judge's approach]
excludes virtually all tenants from meaningful participation in the
conversation. This makes the legal process a charade. This is destruc
tive of more than tenant's statutory rights. For most tenants, such a
court offers a stern lesson that formal rights are for somebody else and
not for them.^°
10 Bezdek, supra note 6, at 586-89 (citing William M. O'Barr & John M. Conley, Litigant
Satisfaction Versus Legal Adequacy in Small Claims Narratives, 19 LAW & SOC'Y. REV. 661 (1985)
[hereinafter O'Barr]).
In studies of self-represented litigants in small claims courts, Conley and O'Barr dis
covered two contrasting modes of organizing and presenting accounts of the dispute
to the judge: rule-oriented and relation-oriented accounts. ... A rule-oriented ac
count is directed to legal rules. A relational account is oriented with respect to social
rules. The impact of the two story-presenting modes on small claims judges is signifi
cant. The courts typically treat relational accounts dismissively and regard their con
tent as irrelevant and inappropriate ....
Bezdek, supra note 6 at 586-87. Professor Bezdek also argues that the court's rejection of the
mode of discourse of the pro se tenant is exacerbated by (or perhaps even rooted in) the tenant s
economic and often race- and gender-based position of subordination vis-^-vis the economically
dominant, represented party and the court as an enforcer of that party s rights. Ld. at 565-75,
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But why is narrative rejected as an appropriate way of speaking in
our judicial system, either in testimony or in oral argument? Primarily,
as Professor Bezdek's analysis demonstrates, because narrative is viewed
as being an uneconomic, rambling mode of communication, and as an
inappropriate means for raising or demonstrating cognizable legal claims
on which legal relief may be given. Thus, the pro se litigant is continu
ously interrupted during that narrative either by the attorney's objecting
"She's testifying in a narrative," or by the court's insisting that much of
the narrative is "irrelevant" and, thus, cannot be dealt with in the con
text of the present case, motion, or bearing.
Indeed, Professor Bezdek's observations and conclusions are con
firmed in my own work with pro se litigants in New York's Housing
Court. I have observed such litigants reduced to silence or at best inco
herence in court, even after I bad given them detailed advice and, in
some instances,
se papers," with the advice or papers completely
ignored and, thus, rendered ineffective. Indeed, I have observed judges
and adversaries use the fact that the pro se litigant bad received legal
advice against bet by raising the burden placed on her. I often bear
judges and adversaries say, "Well, you clearly understand your rights!"
but then deprive the litigant of the value of that imputed knowledge by
not permitting her to articulate it in the only manner she knows, i.e., in
narrative form.
This silencing occurs even in the face of the tremendous advances
that have been made under Chief Judge Judith Kaye's Housing Court
restructuring initiative," especially as sensitively implemented by Judge
Fern Fisher, the Administrative Judge of the Civil Court of the City of
New York. It occurs even in the face of the laudable attempts of indi583-85; see also Lucie E. White, Subordination, Rhetorical Skills and Sunday Shoes: Notes on the
Hearing of Mrs. G., 38 BUFF. L. REV. 1, 4 (1990), demonstrating that mere access to formal
adjudicatory rituals does not comport with due process if it does not provide a forum in which
one can acrually speak and be heard:
Familiar cultural images and long-esrablished legal norms construct the subjectivity
and speech of socially subordinated persons as inherendy inferior to the speech and
personhood of dominant groups. Social subordination itself can lead disfavored
groups to deploy verbal strategies that mark their speech as deviant when measured
against dominant stylistic norms. These conditions . . . undermine the capacity of
many persons in our society to use the procedural rituals that are formally available to
them. Furthermore, bureaucratic institutions disable all citizens—especially from
subordinated social groups—from meaningful participation in their own political
lives, (emphasis in original).
11 Judith S. Kaye & Jonathan Lippman, Breaking New Ground (1997).
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vidual Housing Court judges to "hear" the pro se narrative and to do
"justice" in the few minutes given to each case. Indeed, success in elicit
ing pro se narratives, when it occurs, is particularly laudable given the
fact that judges receive little or no training, guidelines, administrative
support or peer assistance regarding how to assist pro se litigants by,
among other things, eliciting narrative. The techniques for assisting pro
se litigants in this way do not come naturally and may be counterintui
tive, even to judges with a Legal Aid or Legal Services background.
In addition, the studies of The Fund for the Modern Court con
firm that despite such ad hoc efforts by some judges, pro se litigants
remain uncertain of both their claims and defenses, and how to articu
late them in a way that the court will recognize or, indeed, permit.
They fail to understand what is going on under the language and rubrics
employed by legal professionals.^^
This silencing occurs at each step of a pro se litigant's contact with
the judicial process and each step reinforces the previous message:
1.

2.

The papers the pro se litigant receives, in spite of "plain language"
reforms, speak a language whose vocabulary and syntax are for
eign to most people;
Answering in the Clerk's office, perhaps unavoidably, commences
a rapid fire, assembly-line, verbal staccato modality: "next," "any
defenses, conditions" (using a check-list answer), "why did you
default?" "why do you need more time?" (again using a check-list
order to show cause form) "next!"

3.

In the Resolution Parts, court officers command: "find your cal
endar number; no, not the index number; go back outside and
find the calendar number"; "you have to wait for the landlord s
attorney"; "no talking in the courtroom!"

4.

Pro se litigants find that their primary "conversation" is with the
landlord's attorney in the hallway, not with the judge; even if they
actually get to talk to a law assistant or the judge, there is a rush
to settle, with limited opportunity to spin out the story: "that's
not relevant"; "I can't deal with that here, now," etc.

12 Brooklyn, supra note 3, at 28-31; Bronx, supra note 3, at 25-29; New York County, supra
note 3, at 33-38.
13 "The forfeiture of rights flows from the barriers facing unrepresented litigants at each
stage of the proceeding and each encounter with the various players in the system. . . . The
difficulties at each stage are compounded, rather than corrected, as the case proceeds." Engler,
supra note 3, at 1989.
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Throughout this process, which is understandably and appropri
ately settlement-directed, the pro se litigant is both seduced and dis
suaded regarding her day in court: "You don't have to settle. You can go
to trial." However, materials prepared by bar associations and the court
system caution the pro se litigant by stating, "If you go to trial, the court
cannot give you any legal advice. It can only give you information.'''
You will be held to the same evidentiary standards as an attorney."'^
Finally, either in a motion before the Resolution Part judge or on trial in
a Trial Part, the pro se litigant's narrative is continuously interrupted by
See Committee on Housing Court, A Tenant's Guide to Housing Court, ASS'N OF THE BAR
OF THE CITY OF N.Y., (Mar. 2004), AF<JTL(«^&I?rhttp;//www.abcny.org/Publications/tenant.htm
("The Judge cannot give you legal advice about your case, but he or she can explain what is
going on, and the procedures and rules that must be followed at a trial."). For a more general
discussion of the term "legal advice," see John M. Greacen, "No Legal Advice from Court Person
nel" What Does that Mean?, 34 JUDGES' J. 10 (1995) (arguing that the term "legal advice" has no
inherent meaning and proposing principles by which to define appropriate information from
clerks and judges, which nevertheless would still exclude advising litigants to take a particular
course of action, taking sides in a proceeding, or providing information to one side that one
would not provide to the other side); John M. Greacen, Legal Lnjhrmation vs. Legal Advice —
Developments During the Last Five Years, 84 JUDICATURE 198 (2001) (summarizing critiques of
his earlier proposals as being too limited and too general); see also Engler, supra note 3, at 2026.
In redefining the roles of court personnel and those staffing assistance programs, the
prohibition against the giving of legal advice by some of the actors in the system must
be abandoned. The distinction between help that constitutes legal advice and help
that does not provides litde guidance to those on the front lines. Moreover, most
assistance needed by unrepresented litigants is likely to involve what would fall within
an intellectually honest definition of legal advice. While guidelines should be devel
oped for what help a particular office or program may provide in a given context, the
limits should not turn on what constitutes legal advice.
Id.
15 See, e.g., Roundtree v. Singh, 533 N.Y.S.2d 609, 610 (N.Y. App. Div. 2d Dept. 1988)
("Although the plaintiff appeared [in this personal injury case] pro se at trial, she did so at her
peril 'A litigant appearing pro se acquires no greater right than any other litigant.'") (emphasis
added, citation omitted); DufFen v. New York, 665 N.Y.S.2d 978, 979-80 (N.Y. App. Div. 3d
Dept. 1997):
Furthermore, claimant's choice to proceed pro se had no effect on his burden to pre
sent legally competent evidence. Although courts will routinely afford pro se litigants
some latitude, a pro se litigant 'acquires no greater right than any other litigant' and
will be held to the same standards of proof as those who are represented by counsel.
Id. (internal citations omitted). But see Mosso v. Mosso, 776 N.Y.S.2d 599, 600 (N.Y. App.
Div. 3d Dept. 2004) ("It is true that respondent, as a pro se litigant, represented herself at her
own risk and acquired no greater rights than other litigants. Nevertheless, some latitude is
appropriate, especially in a proceeding such as this where a pro se litigant wishes to present
evidence in her defense, but is frustrated from doing so through her own 'inexperience and lack
of legal training.'") (internal citations omitted).
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various objections, such as, calls for a narrative, hearsay, irrelevant, best
evidence, foundation, asked and answered, dead man's statute, etc.
Even those within the court system who observe this silencing and
who recognize something is amiss often feel powerless to intervene be
cause of: (1) perceived constraints of role (e.g., "As a judge, I cannot be
perceived to be an advocate for one side."); (2) the crush of the numbers
of cases and the resulting limitations of time, energy and resources; or
(3) a sense that the problems underlying the pro se litigant's inability to
articulate her claims or defenses are social, educational or economic and,
thus, outside the court's ability to address.
However, if Housing Court is to function as a court of law like any
other, rather than as a largely one-sided eviction apparatus, the pro se
litigant's constitutional right to be heard, i.e., to have access to justice,
must be addressed. As early as 1971, in an early right-to-counsel case,
the Appellate Term, First Department, quoted at length from the U.S.
Supreme Court's decision in Boddie v. State of Connecticut^^ acknowl
edging the fundamental constitutional necessity of meeting the chal
lenge of the pro se litigant in New York City s Housing Court:
Prior cases establish, first, that due process requires, at a minimum,
that absent a countervailing state interest of overriding significance.
16 See, e.g., Engler, supra note 3, at 2011-21, 2063-69; see also MEETING THE CHALLENGE,
supra note 4, at 52-62, and Jona Goldschmidt, How Are Courts Handling Pro Se Litigants?" 82
JUDICATURE 13, 17-20 (1998) (summarizing results of surveys of judges regarding the difficul
ties involved in dealing with pro se litigants) [hereinafter Handling Litigants].
17 Chief Judge Judith S. Kaye of the New York State Court of Appeals has proposed that the
Housing Court be reconstituted as a constitutional court, since the Court, in fact, functions in
all respects save name and remuneration like a constitutional court. See Testimony Before Joint
Legislative Session on Court Restructuring, Ocr. 7, 1997, available at hrtp://www.courts.state.
ny.us/press/old_keep/cjtestim.shtml. "The Civil Court, as you know, includes the Housing
Part, which disposes of hundreds of thousands of matters annually yet isn't even a constitutional
court. Consolidation would bring the status of this court in line with its important role in
today's society." Ld. But see Harvey Gee, Is a Hearing Officer Really a Judge? The Presumed
Role of "Judges" in the Unconstitutional New York Housing Court, 5 N.Y. CITY L. REV. 1 (2002)
(arguing that the Housing Court was unconstitutionally created, violating both separation of
powers and due process stricrures, and that its present functioning deprives litigants of due
process. Unfortunately, this intriguing analysis is marred by significant theoretical and factual
errors, including the author's mistaken presumption, asserted without evidence or authority,
that Housing Court judges currentiy have "the authority and the responsibility to investigate the
facts and develop the record . . . [even] where claimants are represented by attorneys. . . . The
housing judge performs an active investigatory role and shoulders an obligation to obtain evi

dence."). Id. at 30.
18 401 U.S. 371 (1971).
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persons forced to settle their claims of right and duty through the
judicial process must be given a meaningful opportunity to be heard.
Early in our jurisprudence, this Court voiced the doctrine that
[wjherever one is assailed in his person or his property, there he may
defend. . . .

The Appellate Term also quoted Justice Douglas' concurring opinion in
which he observed:
Our decisions for more than a decade now have made clear that differ
ence in access to the instruments needed to vindicate legal rights,
when based on the financial situation of the defendant, are repugnant
to the Constitution. . . . Here the invidious discrimination is based on
one of the guidelines: poverty. . . .

The court went on to quote Justice Brennan's concurrence in which he
stated:
Courts are the central dispute-settling institutions in our society. . . .
Where money determines not merely the kind of trial a man [sic] gets,
but whether he [sic] gets into court at all, the great principle of equal
protection becomes a mockery.

The Appellate Term concluded:
If low, moderate or middle income individuals are not to be denied
their constitutional right to the use of courts or legal assistance, society
must face up to this problem and find an effective way to respond to

19 Hotel Martha Washington Co. v. Swinick, 322 N.Y.S.2d 139, 141-43 (N.Y. App. Term
1st Dept. 1971) (quoting Boddie, 401 U.S. at 377. 383, 386, 388 (internal citations and quota
tion marks omitted) (remanding nonpayment case for appointment of counsel)). But see In re
Smiley, 36 N.Y.2d 433, 439-41 (N.Y. 1975) (rejecting constitutional claim for use of public
money to provide counsel, but not the constitutional "access to the courts" analysis in Supreme
Court decisions relied on in Hotel Martha Washington, 322 N.Y.S.2d at 139); see also NYCHA v.
Johnson, 565 N.Y.S.2d 362, 364 (N.Y. App. Term 1st Dept. 1990) (finding its prior determina
tion in Hotel Martha Washington regarding appointment of counsel no longer controlling after
Smiley, 36 N.Y.2d at 439-41). For an early discussion of the constitutional dimensions of access
to justice in New York City's Housing Court, see JUSTICE EVICTED, supra note 3, at 1-7; see also
MEETING THE CHALLENGE, supra note 4, at 19-24. For a comprehensive analysis of the prob
lem of access to justice, particularly for persons without lawyers, see DEBORAH L. RHODE, AC
CESS TO JUSTICE (2004).
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In addition to such fundamental constitutional concerns regarding equal
access to justice, decisions expanding the bases for vacating pro se stipu
lations beyond those articulated in C.P.L.R. § 5015 frequently point to
the/ro se litigant's not having had a fair opportunity to raise defenses.^®
Indeed, even judgments after trial have been reversed where
the trial court did not permit [the pro se litigants] an adequate oppor
tunity to present relevant evidence pertaining to [their defenses]. . . .
As a result, the defenses were not developed and tenants were deprived
of a fair trial. In the interests of justice, tenants should be given an
opportunity to present their evidence upon a new trial.^^

However, these constitutional, statutory, and equitable admonishments
will remain hollow indeed unless we develop methodologies by which
pro se litigants are not merely thrown into the adversarial arena unas
sisted by the various players in our judicial system—most importantly
by the judges presiding over their cases.
II.

MODELS FOR ADDRESSING THE PROBLEM

As daunting as the problems faced by pro se litigants may be, they
are not insoluble. While it may be that the underlying problems cannot
be resolved absent the provision of counsel, models exist which can at
least mitigate the most serious and constitutionally infirm consequences
of appearing pro se in New York City s Housing Court. I do not pro
pose any one of these models as ideal solutions. Each of them presents
problems, both theoretical and practical. Nor do I suggest that the fol
lowing is an exhaustive list of il possible models. However, those in20 See, e.g., Solack Estates v. Goodman, 432 N.Y.S.2d 3, 4 (N.Y. App. Div. 1st Dept. 1980)
("the elderly tenant, in a state of extreme emotional distress, lacked a basic understanding of the
situation confronting her and the significance of the setdement"); see also Thelma Realty Co. v.
Harvey, 737 N.Y.S.2d 500 (N.Y. App. Term 2d Dept. 2001) (vacating pro se stipulation and
final judgment in nonpayment proceeding where tenant was unaware of the legal effect of the
DHCR [rent reduction] order" and where tenant had "alerted the court to the existence of the
DHCR order" prior to entry of a final judgment of possession and issuance of a warrant of
eviction predicated on the unreduced rent); Engler, supra note 3, at 2018-21 (and cases dis
cussed therein).
21 Wenjon Associates v. Morales, N.Y.L.J., Oct. 18, 1985, at 16:3 (App. Term 2d Dept.)
(reversing final judgment in nonpayment proceeding); Mosso v. Mosso, 776 N.Y.S.2d 599, 599600 (App. Div. 3d Dept. 2004) (reversing Family Court order incarcerating pro se parent for
violating order because she "was not given an adequate opportunity to present evidence support
ing her defense").
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eluded here suggest strategies regarding how the problem of assisting pro
se litigants might be addressed.
A.

More Active Judicial Role Within the Strictures of the Present System

Studies of New York City's Housing Court have consistently
shown that some judges are "better" than other judges in mitigating the
problems faced by pro se litigants appearing before them.^^ A more sys
tematic survey of those strategies used by such judges, which has not
been done to date, would provide invaluable ideas about addressing
those issues.^^ At a minimum, such a study should look at what assis
tance, if any, judges and court personnel currently provide pro se liti
gants at motions and evidentiary hearings. It should evaluate whether
such interventions are successful or inefifective.^"* In addition, this sur
vey should make some evaluation regarding whether such interventions
are appropriate to the role of judge as understood in our current adver
sarial system. If the answer to these questions is in the affirmative, rec
ommendations for system-wide adoption should be made. If the answer
is in the negative^' and the intervention strategy is still deemed to be
highly successful, then constitutional, statutory, or administrative re
form should be proposed to allow such modalities of intervention.
22 Brooklyn, supra note 3, at 8-26; Bronx, supra note 3, at 8-23; New York County, supra
note 3, at 8-30.
23 Such surveys in other fora have proved to be invaluable in developing strategies for meet
ing the challenge oipro se litigants. See, e.g.. MEETING THE CHALLENGE, supra note 4, at 52-56;
see also Handling Litigants, supra note 16, at 17-20.
24 Of course, the criteria for determining "successful" or "ineffective" would have to be
carefully articulated. The primary criterion of "successful," however, must be the extent to
which the intervention assists the pro se litigant in being able to articulate her claims and de
fenses, and to understand the nature and the significance of the proceeding in which she is
involved. See Engler, supra note 3, at 2022-31; see aLo Litigants Struggle, supra note 6, at 36-37;
Rebecca A. Albrecht et al., ludicial Techniques for Cases Involving Self-Represented Litigants, 42
JUDGE S J. 16 (2003) [hereinafter Albrecht]. "The law must produce a consistent outcome for all
litigants, regardless of their legal representation, based on the law and facts of their case." Id. at
44. See also infra text accompanying notes 70-80 (discussing successful interventions).
25 For a discussion of the limitations placed on the role of the judge in assisting pro se
litigants under current law, see Albrecht, supra note 24, at 17-23, 42-43 (surveying applicable
Canons of Judicial Ethics and case law). See also Engler, supra note 3, at 2012-13 (same); KERRY
HILL, AMERICAN JUDICATURE SOCIETY, MEETING THE CHALLENGE OF THE PRO SE LITIGANT:
AN UPDATE OF LEGAL AND ETHICAL ISSUES (2002), available at http://www.ajs.org/prose/pro_
legal_ethical.asp (last visited Feb. 15, 2005); Litigant's Struggle, supra note 6, at 39-42 (locating

origin of limitations on judicial role in assisting pro se litigants in the history of the common law
adversarial system).
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Prior to a comprehensive survey of actual practices in New York
City's Housing Court, the reports and recommendations of other
courts, organizations, and scholars suggest some strategies of assistance
that should be implemented. For example, a protocol developed the Pro
se Implementation Committee of the Minnesota Conference of Judges
and a similar draft protocol of the Idaho Committee to Increase Access
to the Courts^^ urge that judges, among other things, explain:
1. The order and protocols of an evidentiary hearing in detail at
the beginning of the hearing;
2. The elements of claims or defenses that each side will need to
demonstrate in order to get the relief they are seeking;
3. The burden of proof the party bringing the proceeding has;
4. The consequences of not demonstrating a necessary element
or bearing ones burden of proof; and
5. The kind of evidence that may or may not be presented and
considered.
The committees also urge judges to question the pro se litigant to obtain
general information about the litigant's claims or defenses.^® What is
particularly important about these protocols is that they provide specific
examples of how a judge can provide her explanations and pose ques
tions within the context of specific case types.^^
In its survey of judges, the American Judicature Society has identi
fied a number of similar strategies that appear to be effective in assisting
pro se litigants; for example:
1. Conducting on-the-record preliminary conferences "to discuss
procedure, deadlines" and "how to do things at trial;
2. Using detailed court forms for motions and providing clear
notices regarding motions and hearings, which should particu
larize the issues to be presented, which party bears the burden,
what the standard of proof will be at the argument/hearing.
26 Pro Se Implementation Committee of the Minnesota Conference of Judges, Protocol to be
Used by Judicial Officers During Hearings Involving Pro Se Litigants (2002) [hereinafter
Protocol],
27 Idaho Committee to Increase Access to the Courts, Proposed Protocol to be Used by
Idaho Judges During Hearings Involving Self-Represented Litigants (2002) [hereinafter Pro
posed Protocol],
28 Protocol, supra note 26; Proposed Protocol, supra note 27,
29 Protocol, supra note 26; Proposed Protocol, supra note 27,
36 MEETING THE CHALLENGE, supra note 4, at 56,
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and the consequences of not appearing or meeting one's
burden;^'
3. Giving "detailed explanations of trial procedures, as time per
mits;" and
4. "[A]llowing narrative testimony" and "actively asking ques
tions and making objections."^^
Regarding evidentiary matters, the Society notes that some judges
explain to the pro se litigant:
1. How^ to identify evidence relevant to prevailing on or defeating
claims;
2. Procedures for obtaining such evidence;
3. The form that evidence may take;
4. What facts must be demonstrated to make that evidence ad
missible (i.e., foundation);
5. The main objections to admissibility (hearsay, best evidence,
etc.);
6. The consequences of not having such evidence;
7. Providing for a reasonable opportunity to obtain such evi
dence; and
8. Assisting the pro se litigant at trial in establishing the necessary
foundational elements for admitting such evidence and in bow
to testify regarding the substance of such evidence.^^
It is this last form of active judicial intervention which causes the
greatest concerns regarding conduct that is deemed inappropriate to the
passive, impartial role of the judge in our present system, and which
gives rise to fears that the judge will appear partisan or as an advocate for
one side. Although these concerns would appear to be less significant in
judge trials (as distinct from the concerns raised in a jury trial, or where
both sides are unrepresented), it is obvious that an appearance of parti
sanship could arise even there. However, as demonstrated above,^^
31 Id. at 56-57. It has also been argued that "[a] rule mandating that [federal] judges inform
pro se litigants of their obligations under Rule 56(e) is necessitated by a layman's inability to
discern his obligations from reading the rule. Some courts . . . derive the mandate from the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. This practice, however, has been rejected entirely by other
courts." Joseph M. McLaughlin, An Extension of the Right of Access: The Pro Se Litigant's Right to
Notification of the Requirements of the Summary Judgment Rule, 55 FORDHAM L. REV. 1109,
1114 (1987) (internal citations omitted).
32 MEETING THE CHALLENGE, supra note 4, at 57.
33 Id. at 57-58; see also Handling Litigants, supra note 16, at 19-20; ZORZA, supra note 6, at
75-84.

34 See supra text accompanying notes 18-21.
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given the constitutional dimensions of the problem, it is necessary to
find some form of intervention that can be implemented without the
appearance of partiality. This implementation, of course, will require
heightened awareness by the judge of the danger of such an appearance,
and clear indications by them on the record regarding why such inter
ventions are being made.^'
However, acknowledging such limiting factors, the American Judi
cature Society has nevertheless adopted as a policy recommendation that
"judges should assure that self-represented litigants in the courtroom
have the opportunity to meaningfully present their case."^*^ The Society
has also recommended that "[jjudges should have the authority to insure
that procedural and evidentiary rules are not used to unjustly hinder the
legal interests of self-represented litigants."'^ The proposals described
above could be implemented within the strictures of the current system
and do not require statutory authorization. Thus, these proposals
should be explored and particularized regarding the appropriate modali35 A particularly interesting discussion of the competing interests of the need for a judge to
develop the record and the judge's appropriate role in that process is found in People v. Arnold,
98 N.Y.2d 63 (N.Y. 2002). Although the Court reversed the trial judge under the facts of that
case for calling a witness on its own in a criminal jury trial, it noted;
In our adversarial system of justice, the roles of the parties and the decision
maker are, in theory, separate and well defined. In actuality, however, our system has
evolved into what commentators have called a "modified" or "regulated" adversarial
system. As a practical matter, trial courts sometimes must take a more active role in
the presentation of evidence in order to clarify a confusing issue or to avoid mislead
ing the trier of fact. Typically, these cases arise in the context of jury trials.
While "neither the nature of our adversary system nor the constitutional require
ment of a fair trial preclude a trial court from assuming an active role in the truthseeking process," the court's discretion is not unfettered. The overarching principle
restraining the court's discretion is that it is the function of the judge to protect the
record at trial, not to make it. Although the law will allow a certain degree of judicial
intervention in the presentation of evidence, the line is crossed when the judge takes
on either the function or appearance of an advocate at trial.
There is no absolute bar to a trial court asking a particular number of questions
of a seated witness or recalling a witness to the stand; or even allowing the People in
narrow circumstances to re-open their case after a defense motion for a trial order of
dismissal, when doing so advances the goals of truth and clarity. A court may not,
however, assume the advocacy role traditionally reserved for counsel, and in order to
avoid this, the court's discretion to intervene must be exercised sparingly.
Id. at 67-68 (internal citations omitted).
36 AMERICAN JUDICATURE SOCIETY, REVISED PRO SE POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 4

(2002).
37 Id. See ako Albrecht, supra note 24, at 45-48 (discussing the general principles that
should guide a judge in assisting the pro se litigant).
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ties for incorporation into the current structure and procedures in
Housing Court, taking into consideration concerns about the appear
ance of partiality.
Similarly, it may also be profitable to consider a more liberal appli
cation of C.P.L.R. § 3017(a), under which "the court may grant any
type of relief within its jurisdiction appropriate to the proof whether or
not demanded, imposing such terms as may be just."^® Accordingly,
absent prejudice to the represented party and given the relatively limited
subject matter jurisdiction of Housing Court, it may be appropriate for
the court to assist the pro se litigant in articulating legal theories for relief
supported by the facts adduced at trial, even if they were not raised in a
pleading. Of course, prejudice to the adversary would have to be
guarded against by, among other things, allowing the adversary suffi
cient opportunity to respond after the court gives clear notice of its
intent to consider a claim and possibly grant relief on that claim.^^
However, the measures described above may not be sufficient in
themselves to prevent unjust results in cases involving pro se litigants.
Thus, some commentators have urged reforms that would significantly
enhance the role of the judge well beyond the parameters suggested by
the proposals noted above and which, in fact, could require administra
tive, statutory, or constitutional authorization.^'' For example, it has
been proposed that
Judges should freely ask questions of unrepresented parties and their
witnesses. When judges make clear to the parties at the beginning of
the hearing that they will ask questions—and explain why (to make
sure they have the information they need to make a decision)—
chances are minimal that their apparent impartiality could be
impaired.^'
38 N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 3017(a) (2005).
39 Such notice is not dissimilar to the notice requirements where a court decides to treat a
motion to dismiss as one for summary judgment pursuant to N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 3211(c) (2005) or
to the court's ability to search the record pursuant to N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 3212(b) (2005) and grant
relief even to the non-moving party.
See, e.g., Engler, supra note 3. But see Litigant's Struggle, supra note 6, at 45 (arguing that
such proposals "do not radically alter the adversarial system or the traditional role of the judge.
Nor do they make the judge the feared gatherer of evidence who may unfairly side with the
party whose theory of the case is consistent with his or her investigation . . .").
•'I Albrecht, supra note 24, at 46 (emphasis added); see also Richard Zorza, The Disconnect
Between the Requirements of Judicial Neutrality and Those of the Appearance ofNeutrality When the
Parties Appear Pro Se: Causes, Solutions, Recommendations, and Implications, 17 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHICS 423 (2004) (arguing that a judge's neutrality—in fact and in appearance—can be pre-
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While such a proposal would not place an affirmative duty on the judge
to develop the factual record,it would authorize the judge to develop
the record more actively than under the present regime. For example,
the judge would be encouraged to ask questions to assure that she would
have the facts necessary to do justice in the matter submitted to her for
adjudication.
In order to avoid either interrupting the pro se litigant's narrative or
the apparent anomaly of the represented party's attorney objecting to
the judge's own questions, that same proposal urges the judge to insist
on conducting the hearing in a more informal manner, particularly re
garding the application of the rules of evidence.^^ Indeed, it recom
mends that the judge ""convince the attorney of the benefits of
proceeding informally," by, among other things, overruling an eviden
tiary objection "on the grounds that it would be a waste of judicial
resources to proceed in formal compliance with the rules of evidence."''^
It further recommends that the judge require the attorney to include in
his objection sufficient understandable information so the pro se litigant
can cure the defect and that the judge refuse to uphold objections
merely on the grounds of the form of a question or testimony.^' Simi
larly, Professor Goldschmidt proposes that:
The judicial role should be expanded by explicit rules authorizing
judges to provide a reasonable degree of assistance to pro se litigants in
presenting their claim or defense. ... [T]he court should assist by
making sure all evidence the pro se litigant wishes to introduce is prop
erly offered and admitted (unless found to be inadmissible due to priv
ilege, irrelevance, immateriality, or redundancy. . . .). It is common
knowledge that judges often assist attorneys by suggesting the correct
form of a question, a certain line of inquiry not being pursued, or the
manner of properly offering a document or other item into evidence.
This proposal would, therefore, authorize similar assistance to pro se
litigants. It may seem to radically change the traditionally passive role
of the adversarial judge, but it is really only a modest expansion of that
role.^^
served if she explains on the record the reasons for and modalities of her assisting a pro se
litigant) [hereinafter Disconnect].
•^2 See discussion infra Part II.C.
43 Albrecht, supra note 24, at 47-48.
44 Id. at 47 (emphasis added).
45 Id. at 47-48; see also ZORZA, supra note 6, at 81-84.
46 Litigant's Struggle, supra note 6, at 48 (emphasis added).
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It is clear that the proposals described above would go a long way
in meeting the challenge of the /?ro se litigant. Under those proposals, a
judge would be expected, indeed required, to provide a reasonable de
gree of assistance to the pro se litigant in articulating her claims or de
fenses and in introducing the evidence required to support those claims
or defenses. However, since these proposals "do not radically alter the
adversarial system or the traditional role of the judge" in that system,^^
they do not address the root cause of the problem faced by the pro se
litigant, i.e., her being thrust into an adversarial system that presumes
representation by a zealous advocate skilled in the technicalities of evi
dentiary law and in the "impenetrable thicket" of New York's housing
law.''«

Thus, we must consider more radical, comprehensive and systemic
reforms, even if they significantly change (1) the nature of our adversary
system, based on its presumption of legal representation; and (2) the
role of the judge in that system, presumed to be one of passivity and
impartiality narrowly defined.The next two subsections will discuss
such proposals.
B.

Incorporating the Simplified Evidentiary Procedures
Applicable to Small Claims Actions

There is general agreement that "[wjhat many describe as the
'technicalities' of the law of evidence present a major barrier to making
court processes open to all. They not only intimidate the parties, but
also create significant barriers to the presentation of evidence to the fact
finder."'" Indeed, many judges view the strict application of the rules of
evidence in hearings involving pro se litigants as impeding a judge's abil
ity to do justice in such cases." One court has succinctly summarized
47 Id. at 45.
48 In re 89 Christopher Inc. v. Joy, 318 N.E.2d 776, 780 (N.Y. 1984).
49 See, e.g., Engler, supra note 3, at 1990-92, 2011-26, 2028-31.
50 ZoRZA, supra note 6, at 81.
51 See, e.g.. Handling Litigants, supra note 16, at 18.
Surprisingly, some judges feel the rules of evidence become a hindrance in certain
cases, as do the attorneys themselves. Several judges suggested a "need to relax the
rules so that justice can be done." Sometimes, "the lawyer whines and complains that
the other side doesn't follow the [evidentiary] rules. That is true to a point, but the
[evidentiary] rule often gets in the way of the 'truth.'" One judge explained, "It's
amazing how much evidence can be presented without attorneys. Much more effec
tive. Lawyers try to hide evidence much of the time."
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the practical impact of the strict application of evidentiary rules on the
ability of pro se litigants to present their cases to a judge:
It is simply unrealistic to expect lay litigants to understand and abide
by the formal rules of evidence. How is a lay plaintiff to be made to
understand that the bill for services which he presents to show the
repair costs for his damaged property must be authenticated as a busi
ness record? Or that the police report of an accident proves nothing
in the eyes of the law?... In the case of inexperienced pro se litigants,
it is better to err on the side of admitting an ore-heap of evidence in
the belief that nuggets of truth may be found amidst the dross, rather
than to confine the parties to presenting assayed and refined matter
which qualifies as pure gold under the rules of evidence.

As demonstrated above in Part I, the primary reason why eviden
tiary rules frustrate and, indeed, silence pro se litigants in presenting
their claims and defenses is our adversarial common law system's rejec
tion of narrative as an appropriate modality for the introduction of evidence.^^ As we also saw above in Part I, the mere imparting of legal
information to a pro se litigant, including regarding the rules of evi
dence, is generally insufficient to overcome the silencing effect of the
imposition of the strictures of our formal adversarial system, including
Id. See ako John Sheldon & Peter Murray, Rethinking the Rules of Evidentiary Admissibility in
Non-Jury Trials, 86 JUDICATURE 227, 228 (2003) [hereinafter Sheldon] ("When [a pro RE] liti
gant faces a party represented by counsel in a jury-waived proceeding, rules of admissibility
become more than superfluous: They become weapons that the lawyer can use to gain an advan
tage that has nothing to do with the merits of the case."). Thus, in order to facilitate the
admission of clearly relevant and important facts, judges sometimes relax strict evidentiary re
quirements, even when the party is represented by counsel. See, e.g.. MEETING THE CHAL
LENGE, supra note 4, at 57-58; Litigant's Struggle, supra note 6, at 48 ( It is common knowledge
that judges often assist attorneys by suggesting the correct form of a question, a certain line of
inquiry not being pursued, or the manner of properly offering a document or other item into
evidence.").
52 Houghtaling V. Superior Court, 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d 855, 859-60 (Cal. Ct. App. 4th 1993).
53 See also O'Barr, supra note 10, at 666-67.
Our analysis of our earlier data repeatedly confirmed the intuition that lay witnesses
come to formal courts with a repertoire of narrative customs and strategies that are
often frustrated, directly or indirecdy, by the operation of the law of evidence. . . .
These restrictions and prohibitions are supported by the statutory or common law of
evidence or by unwritten custom widely followed in formal courts. Yet reflection on
how we ordinarily speak suggests that each [evidentiarily] forbidden practice is com
mon, if not essential, in everyday narration.
Id. (emphasis added).
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evidentiary rules, which presumes representation by a trained zealous
advocate.®''
Thus, a number of commentators have recommended that eviden
tiary rules be relaxed, or indeed, be jettisoned completely in cases in
volving pro se litigants, using the model of Small Claims courts as a
guide for such a reform.®® Given that the imposition of evidentiary
rules is a key element in the silencing of pro se litigants, I agree that
consideration must be given to adopting the "informal and simplified
procedures" used in Small Claims actions in proceedings involving pro se
litigants in housing court, or at least to adapting some of those proce
dures to such proceedings. The New York City Civil Court Act, in
establishing the procedures for Small Claims actions, provides: "The
court shall conduct hearings upon small claims in such manner as to do
substantial justice between the parties according to the rules of substan
tive law and shall not be bound by statutory provisions of rules of practice,
procedure, pleading or evidence. . . ."®^
Of course, one would have to ensure that the panoply of rights and
protections guaranteed by the complex body of substantive real property
and rent regulation law are not compromised under the guise of doing
"substantial justice." The few reported New York cases interpreting the
notion of "substantial justice" indicate that that concept can be "a fluid
criterion, and sometimes substantial justice is found by turning the judi
cial face slightly away from the technical rule of substantive law."®^
5*1 See supra note 7 and accompanying text; see also O'Barr, supra note 10, at 672.
Witnesses' reactions to [evidentiary] objection sequences suggest that they have little
understanding of the nature of this conflict [between the epistemological assumptions
of the law of evidence and those of ordinary narrative speech] and that the explanations
offered by the courts do little to enlighten them about why the law deems their narratives
unacceptable.
Id. (emphasis added).
55 See Engler, supra note 3, at 2028; see also Litigant's Struck, supra note 6, at 51-53;
ZoRZA, supra note 6, at 81-83.
56 N.Y. CITY CIV. CT. ACT § 1804 (McKinney 2005) (emphasis added).
57 N.Y. CITY Crv. CT. ACT § 1804 (McKinney 2005) (Practice Commentary); see also
DAVID B. SIEGEL, NEW YORK PRACTICE § 582, pp. 967-68 (3d ed. 1999) [hereinafter SIEGEL]
(citing for the contrary position Gerald Lebovits, Small Claims Courts Offer Prompt Adjudication
Based on Substantive Law, 70 N. Y. ST. B.J. 6, 9 (1998) [hereinafter Lebovits] ("The dominant
view, however, is thar judges and arbitrators in small . . . claims courts must strictly fblbw
substantive law when deciding the merits of the claim." (emphasis added) (and cases cited
therein)); see also ARTHUR F. ENGORON, SMALL CLAIMS MANUAL; A GUIDE TO SMALL CLAIMS
LITIGATION IN THE NEW YORK STATE COURTS 41-43 (Comprehensive Version, 5th ed., 2001)
[hereinafter ENGORON]. In support of his own position. Professor Siegel particularly notes the
Small Claims court's decision in Bierman v. New York, 302 N.Y.S.2d 696 (N.Y. Civ. Ct., N.Y.
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Thus, it would have to be made clear that under this proposal a judge
would be required to determine "substantial justice" strictly within the
terms established by the substantive provisions of applicable housing
law.^®

One might also consider a modified application of Small Claims
procedures. For example, one could relax the rules of evidence only
where the unrepresented party bears the burden of proof, or only where
both sides are unrepresented, or where the represented party consents to
the relaxation.
One might also consider whether evidentiary rules
should be relaxed only for the pro se litigant or also for the represented
party. However, such shifting rules would appear to place an unneces
sary burden on a judge to determine which rules should apply in the
matter before the court and could lead to confusing and inconsistent or
indeed arbitrary application. Thus, I would propose that a uniform ap
proach be adopted in all cases where at least one party is pro se in which
the same evidentiary rules apply to both parties, whether they are repre
sented or not.®° However, within such a uniform system, one could
Co. 1969), in which the court sm sponte applied strict liability in order to do "substantial
justice," rather than negligence as required by the cause of action at issue in that case and
applicable appellate law. However, the Appellate Term reversed this decision in part, holding
that:
It being the mandate of the statute (CCA, § 1804) that the rules of substantive law
are applicable to the Small Claims Court, the court below erred in departing from the
traditional rules of negligence and in adopting a rule of strict liability without fault.
Stability and certainty in the law requires adherence to precedents by courts of origi
nal jurisdiction, and the decisions of the Court of Appeals must be followed by all
lower courts. If a rule of strict liability is to be adopted, the pronouncement should
come from the Legislature or the Court of Appeals, and not from a court of original
jurisdiction.
Bierman v. Consol. Edison Co., 320 N.Y.S.2d 331, 332 (N.Y. App. Term 1st Dept. 1970)
(internal citations omitted). Thus, I agree with Judge Lebovits that the small claims model
demonstrates that the provisions of substantive law must and can he preserved even in a system
that relaxes evidentiary and procedural requirements.
58 This dual nature of the court—informal in procedure, hut formal in applying substantive
law—would have to be made clear to the pro se litigant. "If one party and the judge are proce
durally informal and substantively legalistic while the other party proceeds informally in both
respects, the latter is seriously disadvantaged, for only her opponent is addressing the normative
issues that concern the court." Richard Lempert, The Dynamics of Informal Procedure: The Case
of a Public Housing Eviction Board, 23 LAW AND SOC'Y. REV. 347, 393 (1989).
59 Some commentators have su^ested strategies by which a court might "convince the attor
ney of the benefits of proceeding informally." Albrecht, supra note 24, at 47 (emphasis added);
see also ZORZA, supra note 6, at 81-83.
60 See Albrecht, supra note 24, at 18 (recommending that the same protocols be applied
whether the other party is represented or not).

680

CARDOZO PUB. LAW, POLICY & ETHICS J.

[Vol. 3:659

jettison either in whole or in part all evidentiary rules or only those
which might have a greater likelihood of excluding otherwise reliable
evidence, e.g., hearsay or documentary foundations.®'
Because Housing Court trials are predominantly judge trials, the
judge's ability to disregard inadmissible facts ameliorates concerns about
the judge's having before her facts that might be inadmissible in a for
mal evidentiary hearing.®^ The primary focus of the system would be to
allow the pro se litigant's narrative to unfold with minimal interruptions
61 See Sheldon, supra note 51, at 231; see also MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, 1, at § 327
(John William Strong ed., 4th ed. 1992) [hereinafter Strong]. Of course, in general, the issue of
exclusion does not arise unless the represented party raises an evidentiary objection. See ZORZA,
supra note 6, at 81 ("In theory then, in most jurisdictions, in the absence of objection, most
evidence comes in and may be given what weight the fact finder finds appropriate.") (citing
Strong, supra, at § 52 ("The general approach, accordingly, is that a failure to object to an offer
of evidence at the time the offer is made, assigning the grounds, is a waiver upon appeal of any
ground of complaint against its admission.")); see also MICHAEL M. MARTIN ET AL. NEW YORK
EVIDENCE HANDBOOK § 1.3 (2003) (discussing same result under New York law).
62 Sheldon, supra note 51, at 228.
When judges sit without juries, however, there is no point either in trying to screen
evidence or in issuing limiting instructions. Screening is impossible, because the per
son who does the screening is the very person from whom the evidence is supposed to
be screened, and it makes no sense to ask judges to instruct themselves.
Id.-, Strong, supra note 61, at § 60 ("[Jjudges possess professional experience in valuing evidence
greatly lessening the need for exclusionary rules."). But see Andrew J. Wistrich, Chris Guthrie,
Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Can Judges Ignore Inadmissible Information?, 153 U.P.L.R. 1251, 1251-52
(2005) (arguing that "judges are generally unable to avoid being influenced by relevant but
inadmissible information of which they are aware."). Nevertheless under our current system,
[appellate] courts have said that in reviewing a case tried without a jury the admission
of inadmissible evidence [even] over objection will not ordinarily be a ground of rever
sal if there was admissible evidence received sufficient to support the findings. The
judge will be presumed to have disregarded the inadmissible and relied on the admissi
ble evidence.
Strong, supra note 61, at § 60; see also RICHARD T. FARRELL, PRINCE, RICHARDSON ON EVI
DENCE § 1-103 (1995). Of course, a finding of plain error, where the substantial rights of a
party are affected by admitting inadmissible evidence, can result in reversal. Strong, supra note
61, at § 52; cf. N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 2002 (2005) ("An error in a ruling of the court shall be disre
garded if a substantial right of a party is not prejudiced."). For a summary of the arguments for
abolishing the rules of evidence in all non-jury trials, whether or not they involve pro se litigants,
see Sheldon, supra note 51, at 229 (noting that in other common law countries "the common
law of admissibility of evidence ... has little practical impact in civil trials before judges. In
England, the admissibility of most forms of evidence in civil cases is left to the trial justice's
sound discretion."); see also FRANKLIN STRIER, RECONSTRUCTING JUSTICE: AN AGENDA FOR
TRIAL REFORM 157-58 (1994) [hereinafter STRIER] (proposing the elimination of exclusionary
rules, particularly the hearsay rule, even in jury trials); but see Jeremy A. Blumenthal, Shedding
Some Light on Calls for Hearsay Reform: Civil Law Hearsay Rules in Historical and Modem Perspec
tive, 13 PACE INT'L. L.REV. 93 (2001) (arguing that evidentiary rules are essential to our com
mon law adversarial system).
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or objections. Perhaps objections, to the extent that they are allowed,
could be reserved or raised in short hand form or be agreed to prior to
trial. Thus, the goals would be to avoid interrupting the narrative with
objections and to find another way of preserving technical evidentiary
objections on the record to the extent that they would be incorporated
into this model.®^
In any event, the relaxing of the rules of evidence and procedure,
which appear to be two significant determinants in silencing pro se liti
gants, will go a long way to address the problems identified above in
Part I of this paper. However, adopting a Small Claims court model is
not a guarantee that pro se litigants will be able to fully and adequately
articulate their narrative before the court. As noted above. Professor
Bezdek observed systemic silencing of pro se litigants in Baltimore's Rent
Court, which is based on the Small Claims model with relaxed rules of
evidence.^ Thus, the mere relaxing of evidentiary rules will not in and
of itself assure that the pro se litigant's narrative will be elicited and
heard in any legally meaningful sense.''' Rather, the court must also
address three additional factors which contribute to the pro se litigant's

63 See supra notes 43-44 and accompanying text; see also Litigant's Struggle, supra note 6, at
48.
64 See supra notes 7-10 and accompanying text; see also Bezdek, supra note 6, at 588 ("In
small claims courts, where many such evidentiary constraints are relatively relaxed, we might
expect there to be more tolerance for ordinary speech," finding that such is not the case);
O'Barr, supra note 10 (documenting the factors in Small Claims courts which limit the legal
adequacy of pro se narratives); Litigant's Struggle, supra note 6, at 42 (and works cited there).
65 See, e.g., Engler, supra note 3, at 2044 ("rule changes alone are unlikely to eliminate
problems facing the unrepresented poor . . .") (citing Marc Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come Out
Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change, 46 OHIO ST. L.J. 243, 245, 268 (1985)); see
also John M. Conley & William M. O'Barr, Fundamentals of Jurisprudence: An Ethnography of
Jtidicial Decision Making in Lnformal Courts, 66 N.C. L. REV. 467, 506 (1988) [hereinafter
Conley].
Informal justice is also a process created to protect individual rights. Small claims
courts were conceived in part to enable consumers, tenants, and others with limited
power to assert rights inexpensively and expeditiously. As our data demonstrate, how
ever, there is no such thing as the process of informal justice. It is, rather, a broad
range of diflferent processes, with the differences deriving in significant part from the
role perceptions of those [i.e., judges] who administer it. . . .
We can only reiterate our concern about the discrepancy between the ideal of a system
of informal justice designed to help certain types of litigants and the reality of many
systems, each of which meets some needs but may ignore others. We are troubled that
this variation is effectively concealed from litigants and beyond their control.
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silencing even without the strictures of formal evidentiary rules of
exclusion.*^^
First, a judge should not be seduced into believing that the mere
relaxing of evidentiary rules, in and of itself, remedies the power imbal
ance between a pro se and a represented party. As noted above, the
economic and often racial and gender status of the pro se tenant places
her in a position of subordination within the legal system, and pro
foundly affects her ability to speak or to have her voice heard in any
meaningful or persuasive way by the court.®^ This power imbalance is
further exacerbated by the advantage resulting from the dominant
party's usually being represented by a zealous advocate, skilled in both
substantive and procedural law, and familiar with the culture and prac
tices of the Housing Court in which he or she practices on a regular,
indeed often on a daily basis.^® Accordingly, the court must consistently
and systematically "[rjemain alert to imbalances of power in the
courtroom.
Techniques for addressing this imbalance have been suggested by
commentators. For example, a judge needs to be sure to inquire about
the pro se litigant's views on the issues before the court at each stage of
the trial, hearing, or motion.^" The court should also resist the tempta
tion of allowing the attorney, who may be more facile in using the ter
minology and categories familiar to the court, to define the factual and
legal issues before the court.^^ This is particularly important where the
•56 The concerns and techniques set forth below are also applicable even where the rules of
evidence are in full effect. See discussion supra Part LA.
See supra notes 9-10 and accompanying text.
•58 See Engler, supra note 3, at 2068-69.
Albrecht, supra note 24, at 47; see also Beatrice A. Moulton, The Persecution and Intimida
tion of the Low-Income Litigant as Performed by the Small Claims Court in California, 21 STAN
FORD L. REV. 1657 (1969) (describing effects of power imbalance in spite of the Small Claims
judge's statutory power to conduct an informal hearing, raise objections or defenses for a party,
conduct independent investigation of facts, disregard technical rules of evidence, and exercise
equitable powers).
70 Albrecht, supra note 24, at 47; see also Disconnect, supra note 41, at 439 ("Judicial inquiry
of the parties as to whether they understand what is expected of them, what the judge is doing,
what has been decided, and the consequences of that decision . . . serve[ ] justice by making it
possible to obtain more information when misunderstanding has led to lack of information, and
serve[ ] the appearance of justice by showing the interest of the judge in justice.")
71 Bezdek, supra note 6, at 569-70 (describing how even unrepresented landlords are often
allowed to establish the terms of the court's inquiry of the pro se litigant). It is my own experi
ence in Housing Court that a judge will more frequently than not turn to the attorney and
inquire, "So, what's going on here counselor?" Of course, where the landlord bears the burden
to make out a prima facie case, it is customary for that party to present its case first. The issue
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pro se litigant bears the burdens of proof or persuasion, such as in press
ing an affirmative defense, or in moving for relief by order to show
cause. Accordingly, by employing techniques which signal to the pro se
litigant that her view of the facts or the law is not being discounted
simply because of her economic, racial, gender, or pro se status, but in
deed is welcome and valued, the court will in some measure mitigate the
silencing effects of such status-based subordination.
Second, a judge must construct appropriate modalities of interven
tion to assist the pro se litigant in telling her story or narrative to the
court. As described above, the strictures of evidentiary rules, particu
larly in disallowing narrative and other ordinary forms of speech, signifi
cantly limit the pro se litigant's ability to speak and to be heard.
However, if the court merely invites the pro se litigant to "tell your
story," or "explain why you are here today," or "tell me why your land
lord should not get a judgment of possession against you," the resulting
narrative, free from evidentiary constraints but unassisted by judicial in
tervention, will generally be factually incomplete and legally insuffi
cient.^^ Thus, judicial intervention is essential. O'Barr and Conley
have catalogued some of the indicia in unassisted pro se narratives which
signal the pro ses quandary regarding the sufficiency of her story and her
need for intervention.^^ For example, pro se litigants will frequently ask
where to begin or end the narrative, or otherwise indicate that they do
not know the "relevant" time periods. They will also continue the narhere is not essentially one of chronology. Rather, the primary issue is one of dominance by the
represented party and the court's deference to or reliance on that party's presentation of the
issues as the sole lens through which the evidentiary hearing or motion is seen.
Invariably, the judge starts the hearing with the landlord's claim ... So the tenant
starts her comments with [that claim]. Most often, only [the landlord's claim] has
been spoken of when the judge dismisses the tenant's speech and rules for the land
lord. As structured, it excludes virtually all tenants from meaningful participation in
the conversation. This makes the legal process a charade.
Bezdek, supra note 6, at 589.
72 O'Barr, supra note 10, at (>7(s-77 (describing how pro se litigants in Small Claims courts
"invariably responded [to such invitations] not by answering the questions in a narrow sense but
by commencing a chronological narrative of the dispute as they perceived it. The scope of these
narratives often went far beyond the facts that the court was empowered to adjudicate."); id. at
662 (^'unassisted lay witnesses seldom impart to their narratives the deductive, hypothesis-testing
structure with which judges are most familiar and often fail to assess responsibility for events in
question the way that the law requires.") (emphasis added); Bezdek, supra note 6, at 588
(describing how by asking the pro se litigant "Is there anything you want to tell me?," the judge
"is structuring the discourse by leading the tenant into expression and then dismissing that
which the judge elicited. Doing so in this way is both misleading and destructive").
73 O'Barr, supra note 10, at 683-84.
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rative, with segments linked with "ands" or pauses until they think
they've told "enough." They frequently use "rising intonation" at the
end of segments, which signals a request for "acknowledgment and
understanding.
Without assistance from the judge, the pro se litigant will simply
continue her narrative until she thinks what she has said is sufficient to
defeat the landlord's claim or support her request for relief.^^ However,
she will generally not have structured the narrative in a deductive man
ner, based on a theory of the case, which directly refutes the landlord's
claim in a manner that is cognizable under the applicable law or which
supports her defense, affirmative defense, or counterclaim.^'^ Accord
ingly, unassisted, the pro se litigant's narrative will generally be seen to
be legally inadequate,^^ in spite of the fact that they will often contain
all of the elements which, if marshaled by a lawyer, would be legally
adequate.^®
Thus, the judge must assist the pro se litigant in structuring and
developing her narrative so that its legal adequacy can be articulated and
evaluated. O'Barr and Conley have documented the efficacy of judicial
interventions which guide the pro se litigant in: (1) identifying narrative
beginning and end points;^^ (2) emphasizing facts which are more pro
bative than others regarding the primary legal issues before the court; (3)
specifying the harm suffered or the relief sought; (4) identifying corrob
orative facts; (5) constructing facts according to the legal elements re74 Id.
75 Id. at 685 ("When [the pro se litigant] concludes, he appatently believes that he has given
the court an adequate basis for finding against [the other party].").
76 Id. at 685-86 ("It may be significant that in his narrative, the \pro se litigant] proceeded as
if the facts would speak for themselves. ... He does not lay out a theory of the case for testing.
Rather, he presents the facts he considers relevant and expects them to lead to a conclusion.").
77 Id, at 684 ("The most significant problems faced by small claims litigants relates to the
legal adequacy of their narratives. . . . Legally inadequate narratives are for our purposes narra
tives that differ substantially in form and content from the accounts judges are accustomed to
dealing with by training and experience.").
78 Id at 678.
The narrator provides three types of evidence within his account. First, he produces
documents that support his story. Second, he calls 'witnesses' by performing their
parts. Third, he introduces physical evidence. ... In an everyday account, some of
these might not have been included. Their inclusion in the [pro re r] testimony hints
at his conception of legal adequacy. . . . Analyzed in this manner, relatively uncon
strained narratives offered as evidence to the court reveal lay models of the kinds of
accounts that are appropriate and sufficient to prove a [claim or defense].
Id. (emphasis in original).
79 O'Barr, supra note 10, at 683.
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quired for relief; and (6) responding to the landlord's factual and legal
claims or defenses.®®
Accordingly, even in a system freed from the strictures of eviden
tiary rules, the role of the judge must be expanded to include "facilitat
ing the unrepresented litigant's presentation of his or her own case—as
the litigant has conceived it. . . ."®' However, this expansion of the role
of the judge is perhaps a judge's most daunting challenge in dealing
with pro se litigants, since it may challenge the judge's deeply-held no
tion of the appropriate judicial role as being one of a passive trier offers
presented to her by others.®^ It also requires a judge to acknowledge
that her notion of her role significantly affects and, to some degree,
determines the extent and nature of the interventions she is prepared to
make to assist a pro se litigant. There is no question that most judges
80 Id. at 693-94 (describing a pro se litigant who "had the benefit of a referee who was
and able to develop a theory of [the case], frame the case in deductive terms, and then
test the hypothesis developed against the evidence."); see id. at 696 (describing magistrates who
"intervene sometimes to restructure testimony for the apparent benefit of the witness and some
times to resolve an issue that the witness seems determined to avoid."). The techniques by
which any interviewer, including, with some modification, a judge, can obtain information from
a witness in a non-leading, "non-suggestive" manner are well-documented in the literature on
client and witness interviewing. See, e.g., Richard C. Wydick, The Ethics of Witness Coaching, 17
CARDOZO L. REV. 1, 41-52 (1995) (describing (1) the "simple" techniques of "cognitive inter
viewing" which help the witness remember and narrate the full facts of her narrative, i.e., assist
ing the witness in reinstating the context in which the events took place; urging the witness to
tell all of the facts, not those which she believes to be "relevant"; assisting the witness in remem
bering events in different orders and from different perspectives; and (2) the stages of such an
interview, i.e., inviting an open-ended narration; probing for details by directing the witness's
attention back to each significant topic, beginning with open-ended questions, followed-up with
narrower questions for each topic; and reviewing with the witness all of what is judged to be
relevant information culled during the prior stages); see also Disconnect, supra note 41, at 443-45
(describing techniques for assisting a pro se litigant during direct examination and in making out
a prima facie case). Little or no judicial training is currently in place for Housing Court judges
regarding these interventions and techniques. Accordingly, judicial training and continuing le
gal education must include exposure to and an opportunity to practice such modalities of
willing

assistance.
81 Albrecht, supra note 24, at 44 (noting that such assistance does not transform the judge
into an advocate, but simply a facilitator); Litigant's Struggle, supra note 6, at 48-51 (describing
the court's role in facilitating admission of evidence and bringing out facts ); Lebovits, supra
note 57, at 10 ("Judges and arbitrators [in small claims courts] have nearly unfettered discretion,
subject to-due process concerns, in 'taking active charge of the proceedings and examining wit
nesses.'") (citation omitted).
82 See supra notes 8, 15, 16, 25, 35; see also STRIER, supra note 62, at 84, ("[T]he AngloAmerican judge's image and functions as those of a mere moderator of a contest. . . have left his
seemingly powerful figure (and with him the parties) at the mercy of the professional combat
ants.") (quoting ALBERT EHRENZWEIG, PSYCHOANALYTIC JURISPRUDENCE 265 (1971)).

686

CARDOZO PUB. LAW, POLICY & ETHICS J.

[Vol. 3:659

have some general notion of what they believe to be role-appropriate
interventions based on their understanding of current legal and ethical
norms,as well as their own practices.®^ However, in an empirical
study of more than eighty Small Claims cases in Colorado and North
Carolina, Conley and O'Barr have documented five distinctive judicial
role-types and their significant impact on each type's trial practices and
decisions:®'
Judges applying the same substantive and procedural law—and some
times sitting in adjacent courtrooms—dispense justice in radically dif
ferent ways. . . . Our examination of what judges say in rendering onthe-spot judgments suggests that this behavioral variation derives from
divergent conceptions of the judge's role and the nature of legal deci
sion-making. Thus, the law interpreter 0udge A), who rarely deviates
from the straightforward application of legal rules, speaks of a process
in which she is at the mercy of unyielding principles, even when she is
disturbed by the results they produce. The law maker 0udge B), who
adapts or even invents rules of law in pursuit of justice as she sees it,
expresses herself in terms which suggest that the law is there to serve
her ends, and not vice versa. The mediator 0udge C), who treats the
adjudicative process as simply an opportunity to work out a compro
mise, puts similar emphasis on her central and highly discretionary
role in the system. The authoritarian 0udge D), who renders defini
tive legal judgments and often involves himself in the personal affairs
of the litigants, speaks in extraordinarily personal terms in exercising
his authority. Finally, the proceduralist 0udge E), defined by his
close, sometimes obsessive attention to procedural details, paints a ver
bal picture of a legal decision maker who is armed with discretionary
power, yet protected from direct interaction with the litigants by sev
eral layers of legal formality. In each instance, there is a clear parallel
between the judge's attitude as revealed in his unrehearsed speech and
the individual's behavior on the bench.®^

Accordingly, judges must reflect on whether their concept of judi
cial role-type, perhaps using the above typology as a guide, limits their
ability to implement the interventions proposed in this section as necesSee supra note 25.
See supra notes 30-33 and accompanying text.
Conley, supra note 65, at 481-504 (describing conclusions of their study of more than
eighty Small Claims proceedings, which included observation of each proceeding, review of
transcripts, and conversations with the judges involved).
Id. at 504.
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sary to assure pro se litigants' equal access to justice.®^ As has been ar
gued throughout this paper and by other commentators, a judge's
individual concept of role must give way to assuring equal access to
justice for the pro se litigantA® Absent such a refocusing and reformu
lating of the role of the judge, even in a system not hound by the stric87 There are, of course, considerations other than that of "role" that may deter a judge from
assisting a pro se litigant. Related to considerations of "role" is the court's concern about an
appearance of partiality. See Engler, supra note 3, at 2011-21; see also Litigant's Struggle, supra
note 6, at 48-49 (noting that "assistance [to pro se litigants] is only perceived as unfair by the
represented litigant who already has an unfair advantage over the pro se litigant."); Disconnect,
supra note 41, at 437.
If what happens [during trial] is analyzed only in moment to moment terms it may
seem non-neutral, when, for example, a judge asks a question of one party. But if that
question is established as part of a process in which all [witnesses] are asked questions
when needed for the judge to understand what happened, then a process that is seen
to be neutral in an overall sense has been created . . . even if it may help more those
who need to be helped because they lack counsel or education or both.
Id. (emphasis added). In addition, judges have legitimate political concerns regarding their reap
pointment to the bench if their assistance to the unrepresented litigant is perceived to be con
trary to the interests of the economically, and thus politically, dominant party in the proceeding.
This concern was expressed a number of times during the discussions of the "Adjudicative Pro
cess and the Role of the Court" working group. See supra note 1.
Fostering the notion that the judge is 'above the fray,' exercising her authority solely
in accord with her conscience and interpretation of the law, is more appealing to the
judge if she must stand for election to retain her seat. Election creates a potential
conflict of interest: Political considerations may influence a judge's actions. Passivity
serves to buffer elective judges against public recriminations from unpopular deci
sions, particularly in non-jury cases.
STRIER, supra note 62, at 84.
Housing Court judges are subject to reappointment every five years at the discretion of the
administrative judge. N.Y. CITY CIV. CT ACT § 110(f)-(i) (2005). Although Housing Court
judges are not elected, they face the same "conflict of interest" concerns oudined by Professor
Strier, supra, as part of the reappointment process. As part of the reappointment process, a
Housing Court judge must be put forward by the Housing Court Advisory Committee, which
contains representatives from the real estate industry. Id. § 110(g). The judge must then be
interviewed by various bar associations, which also contain members from the landlords bar and
others sympathetic to their interests. Finally, the Housing Court judge is reappointed solely at
the discretion of the Chief Administrative Judge of the Courts, who is usually elected or ap
pointed by an elected official, and thus is also subject to the same political pressures noted above.
Accordingly, the concerns expressed by Housing Court judges about the implications for their
reappointment should they assist pro se litigants in the enhanced manner proposed here is not
without merit. Thus, statutory or administrative enactments legitimizing these forms of judicial
intervention would go a long way In shielding Housing Court judges from the political and
reappointment pressures described above that may limit their assistance to pro se litigants.
88 Engler, supra note 3, at 2022-23.
The adversarial system purports to promote fairness and justice. Yet, the rules cur
rently operate as barriers preventing unrepresented litigants from participating mean
ingfully in the legal system and thereby frustrate the goal of dispensing fairness and
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tures of formal evidentiary rules, "the effectiveness of changes such as
these [jettisoning or, at least, significantly restricting the application of
formal rules of evidence], will be limited, if not undercut. . .
C.

Adopting an Administrative Procedure or Inquisitorial Model in
Which the Judge Bears an Affirmative Duty to Develop the
Factual Record and to Identijy Controlling Law

Both of the proposals described above involve an enhanced role for
a judge in assisting the pro se litigant in articulating her theory of the
case and in introducing evidence in support of that theory. It has been
suggested that such an expansion of the judge's role is appropriate even
within our present adversarial system.^" However, my concern in this
section is not with whether the reforms described above require statu
tory or administrative change, but whether those proposals are sufficient
to assure the pro se litigant's equal access to justice. Unfortunately, I
submit that the answer to that question must be in the negative. The
studies and commentaries referred to above suggest that even with en
hanced judicial assistance, the fundamental power imbalance between
represented and unrepresented parties in Housing Court—both statusbased and in terms of the pro se litigant's lack of familiarity and facility
with legal categories—will not be redressed. Accordingly, some com
mentators have proposed that a judge should be given an affirmative
duty to develop the factual record and to identify the controlling law,
following the model of judges in administrative hearings or in jurisdic
tions using an inquisitorial model.^^
justice. Given a choice between clinging to the rules at the expense of the goal, or
modifying the rules to further the goal, the rule must be modified.
Id. (emphasis added); Litigant's Struggle, supra note 6, at 51 ("Both rules of court and judicial
ethics must be modified accordingly to free judges to engage in these activities [i.e., asking
questions, calling witnesses, and conducting limited independent investigations] and determine
the 'truth' in every case.").
Engler, supra note 3, at 2069.
90 Litigant's Struggle, supra note 6, at 45 (arguing that such proposals "do not radically alter
the adversarial system or the traditional role of the judge. Nor do they make the judge the
feared gatherer of evidence who may unfairly side with the party whose theory of the case is
consistent with his or her investigation . . . ."). However, even Goldschmidt acknowledges that
some of his proposals may require some statutory or administrative reforms. See id. at 51.
91 See Engler, supra note 3, at 2017-18, 2028-31; Litigant's Struggle, supra note 6, at 51;
Russell G. Pearce, Redressing Inequality in the Market for Justice: Why Access to Lawyers Will Never
Solve the Problem and Why Rethinking the Role of Judges Will Help, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 969,
975-80 (2004); see also STRIER, supra note 62, at 283-84 (proposing incorporating aspects of the
inquisitorial model even where both parties are represented and even in jury trials).

2006]

ASSURING ACCESS TO JUSTICE

689

An administrative law judge in federal, state, and municipal ad
ministrative fora has an affirmative duty to assist a pro se claimant de
velop her case.^^ This duty to assist requires that the judge "probe into
. . . and explore for all the relevant facts.
Consideration should be
given to the implications of imposing this same duty on Housing Court
judges. Such an imposition would directly address pro se litigants' in
ability to develop factual records and present the facts in a way that
demonstrates the legal sufficiency of their cases.^^
However, merely imposing this duty on a judge by a rule change is
no guarantee that the pro se litigant will receive the assistance she is
promised by such a rule change.^^ Administrative judges frequently fail
to fulfill their obligation to develop the factual record.®^ Accordingly,
the interventions described in the preceding section^^ would have to be
imported here as a mandated component of the judge's duty to develop
the factual record.
The mandated role of the judge in developing the factual record
proposed here also bears some similarity to the role of the judge in the
92 See, e.g., Shaw v. Chater, 221 F.3d 126, 134 (2d Cir. 2000) ("[T]he rule in our circuit [is]
that 'the ALJ, unlike a judge in a trial, must [herjself affirmatively develop the record' in light of
'the essentially non-adversarial nature of a benefits proceeding .... [E]ven when, as here,
claimant is represented by counsel.") (quoting Pratts v. Chater, 94 F.3d 34, 37 (2d Cir. 1996))
(quoting Echevarria v. Sec'y of Ffealth & Human Serv., 685 F.2d 751, 755 (2d Cir. 1982); Diaz
V. Wing, N.Y. L.J., Feb. 6, 2003, at 18:1 (N.Y. App. Div. 1st Dept.) (illustrating that the same is
true regarding New York state and municipal administrative judges).
93 Echeverria, 685 F.2d at 755.
Where, as here, the claimant is unrepresented by counsel, the ALJ is under a height
ened duty to scrupulously and conscientiously probe into, inquire of, and explore for
all the relevant facts. A reviewing court must determine whether the ALJ adequately
protect [ed] the rights of [a] pro se litigant by ensuring that all of the relevant facts [are]
sufficiendy developed and considered.
Id. (quoting Hankerson v. Harriss, 636 F.2d 893, 895 (2d Cir. 1980)) (quoting Gold v. Sec y of
HEW, 463 F.2d 38, 43 (2d Cir. 1972)) (internal quotations omitted).
94 See supra notes 72-80 and accompanying text.
95 See supra note 65.
96 See, e.g., supra note 93 and cases cited therein; see also Paul R. Verkuil, An Outcomes
Analysis of Scope of Review Standards, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 679, 704-09 (2002) (docu
menting reversal rates of more than 50% for Social Security administrative law judge disability
determinations, but arguing that this reversal rate is in part explainable by courts engaging in a
too close review of the factual record under a substantial evidence standard of review). But see
Anthony Taibi, Politics and Due Process: The Rhetoric of Social Security Disability Law, 1990
DUKE L.J. 913 (1990) (arguing that judicial timidity restrains judges from identifying and recti
fying underlying systemic flaws which result in wrong decisions and injury to personal dignity
and autonomy).
97 See supra notes 70-80 and accompanying text.
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inquisitorial model followed in most jurisdictions outside of the United
States.®® Of course, adopting aspects of the inquisitorial model would
have a significant impact on the adversarial nature of our existing judi
cial model and is, thus, unacceptable to some commentators.®® Never
theless, defenses of the adversarial system against incursions of
inquisitorial-based reforms are rooted in the adversarial system's pre
sumption that a zealous lawyer will represent each side in a case.'""
However, the primary landscape in Housing Court for the foreseeable
future is one populated predominantly with pro se litigants. Thus, the
incorporation of at least some aspects of the inquisitorial model, prima
rily by enhancing the role of the judge in developing the factual record,
and in identifying and applying controlling law is essential in guarantee
ing equal access to justice for pro se litigants.
5*® See, e.g.. Litigant's Struggle, supra note 6, at 41.
In this system, the professionally trained judge takes an activist role and ensures a
solution based on the merits of the case by calling witnesses, asking most of the ques
tions, and conducting hearings .... Narrative testimony is invited and, with some
exceptions, most evidence offered by the parties is admitted .... With greater judicial
involvement in fact finding, "the threat of one-sided distortions of misinformation
appears less immediate, and the need to subject means of proof to testing becomes less
compelling."
Id. (citation omitted); STRIER, supra note 62, at 16 ("[T]he judge controls and conducts the
court's investigation, calling witnesses and establishing the scope of the inquiry.").
99 See, e.g.. Litigant's Struggle, supra note 6, at 53 ("[W]e would be sacrificing some impor
tant elements of popular control over the legal system.") (quoting DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND
JUSTICE: AN ETHICAL STUDY 103 (1988) [hereinafter LUBAN]); see also LUBAN, at 98 (noting
that "despite its numerous attractions, the German [inquisitorial] procedure requires other
changes in the legal system and the nexus of values enveloping it that would make the trade-o£F
unacceptable").
100 LUBAN, supra note 99, at 239-41 (arguing that access to the adversary system and the
rules by which that system functions presume representation by an attorney). Professor Luban,
although a staunch defender of the adversarial system against inquisitorial-based reforms, further
notes that our adversarial system not only presumes representation by a lawyer, but is con
structed to require such representation.
The design of a legal system that cannot be operated by laypeople is surely the result
of state decisions, indeed, of the accretion of hundreds of millions of state decisions.
Moreover, the inability of poor people to aflFord lawyers is also the result of choices
made by the state, both formalistically as a matter of law and also as a matter of plain
fact. . . .
[T]he selective exclusion of the poor from the legal system does not simply fail to
confer an advantage on them—it actively injures them.
Id. at 246-47. Professor Luban's solution to this constitutional infirmity is limited to the der
egulation of some routine legal services, mandating pro bono representation, and funding of
legal services, all of which preserve the lawyer-centric and resulting judicial passivity models of
our adversary system, and provide little relief for those who, in spite of these reforms, will appear
in court, including Housing Court, without attorneys. Id.
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In the French civil (and criminal) systems, the judge has the re
sponsibility for fact gathering, including developing facts pre-trial and at
trial by questioning witnesses.'"^ As in summary proceedings in Hous
ing Court, discovery by the parties in the French system is extremely
limited. Rather, the judge directs the development of the factual and
legal issues in the case, and fixes time limits. Appeals are de novol^^
Obviously, the whole cloth importation of such a civil code-based
inquisitorial approach raises significant statutory and potentially consti
tutional issues.In addition, such an importation could give rise to
practical considerations, since the French system relies on fairly welldeveloped dossiers to educate the judge regarding the factual and legal
issues that she is expected to develop and on which she must rule.
There are also theoretical considerations of such an importation given,
for example, the almost exclusive reliance in the French system on docu
mentary evidence due to a fundamental devaluation of the trustworthi
ness of testimony.'°^ Nevertheless, some familiarity with a judicial
system in which the judge plays a significant fact development role, par
ticularly during the phase of the trial called the enquetej^'^ may counter
101 I am deeply indebted in this section to a paper by Professor Anne Moynihan, The French
Judiciary (1996) [hereinafter Moynihan] (prepared for the Housing Court Committee, Associa
tion of the Bar of the City of New York) (describing that system's inquisitorial model and
discussing its applicability to the U.S. civil system and New York City s Housing Court in
particular). See also Nicolas Marie Kublicki, An Overview of the French Legal System from an
American Perspective, 12 B.U. INT'L. L.J. 57 (1994); C.N. Ngwasiri, The Role of the Judge in
French Civil Proceedings, Civ. JusT. Q. 169 (April 1990) [hereinafter Ngwasiri]; Richard S.
Prase, Comparative Criminal Justice as a Guide to American Imw Reform: How Do The French Do
It, How Can We Find Out, and Why Should We Care? 78 CAL. L. REV. 539 (1990); James
Beardsley, Proof of Fact in French Civil Procedure, 34 AM. J. COMP. L. 459 (1986) [hereinafter
Beardsley]; Edward A. Tomlinson, NonadversarialJustice: The French Experience, 42 MD. L. REV.
131 (1983) [hereinafter Tomlinson].
102 Moynihan, supra note 101. For a summary of similar elements in the German system, see
LUBAN, supra note 99, at 94-97; see also STRIER, supra note 62, at 213-18 (comparing the French
and German systems).
103 Moynihan, supra note 101, at 2; see also LUBAN, supra note 99.
104 Beardsley, supra note 101, at 467, 469-70, 480 (claiming that the French system's almost
exclusive reliance on documentary evidence results in fact avoidance, i.e., the failure of the
judge to use the full range of powers and methods available to her to develop the factual record).
In fact, an over-reliance on documentary evidence might severely prejudice a pro se litigant in
Housing Court. Thus, that aspect of the French system may be not only theoretically, but also
practically unsuitable both to the American system in general, but also to the goal of assisting
the pro se litigant in presenting her narrative evidence.
105 Id. at 478-79:
In the enquete the witness is asked by the magistrate to state discursively what he
knows about the case. He will be interrupted from time to time by the magistrate
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a reflexive rejection of such a judicial role simply because American
judges and advocates have little knowledge of or exposure to systems
other than our own adversarial one.'°®
These preliminary explorations suggest that a more comprehensive
investigation of such systems beyond the brief summary provided here
may identify additional means by which the role of the judge can be
enhanced to meet the challenge of pro se litigants in Housing Court.
In any event, one should investigate and evaluate the importation of at
least some aspects of such a role for a judge.For example, Professor
either so that specific questions may be put or to enable the magistrate to dictate to
his clerk (greffier) 3l summary of what the witness has said. . . . During this exercise the
lawyers are seated in the back of the room, out of the line of sight of the witness, and
are only asked at the end of the enquete if there are other questions which they would
like to have the investigating magistrate [not the lawyer] put to the witness. The
m^istrate may decide not to restate the question; he may simply ask the witness to
respond or to clarify his earlier statements. There is, however, none of the psychologi
cal pressure associated with cross-examination as practiced in common law procedure.
Immediately upon the end of the interrogation, the magistrate's summary is handed
to the witness for review and signature.
(emphasis added). See also Ngwasiri, supra note 101, at 176-85.
lofi Indeed, Professor Luban's rejection of inquisitorial-based reforms is premised primarily on
what he calls "a pragmatic argument: if a social institution does a reasonable enough job of its
sort that the costs of replacing it outweigh the benefits, and if we need that sort of job done, we
should stay with what we have." LUBAN, supra note 99, at 92. However, as Professor Luban
acknowledges, the system we have "cannot be operated by laypeople. Id. at 246. Thus, even on
a pragmatic analysis, the present system does not do "a reasonable enough job" for pro se liti
gants and should be changed accordingly. As Professor Strier has noted, "What is prevalent is
not necessarily what is functional or fair. We must be chary of a misplaced complacency that
our trial procedures are optimal, and therefore inviolable. The adversary system is not sacro
sanct. By eschewing labels, we can bring to our table the option to adopt the best features of
foreign systems." STRIER, supra note 62, at 287. Indeed, Professor Ellen E. Sward, has con
cluded that "Adversarial ideology has failed. The adversary system is transforming itself into a
more inquisitorial, less individualistic methodology even as apologists debate the various justifi
cations for adversarial adjudication. The transformation seems to be bringing about a system
that is more effective at fairly complex fact-finding, socially significant rule-making, and behav
ior-modifying litigation. The less individualistic, more communitarian ethic that is reflected in
the transformation should be recognized and encouraged. That recognition may entail aban
doning adversarial ideology, but a focus on our goals and values is more helpful in evaluating
and modifying our adjudicatory system than any rigid ideology could be." Values, Ideology and
the Evolution of the Adversary System, 64 IND. L.J. 301, 355 (1988/1989).
107 "An understanding of the inquisitorial system trial is essential to a broader appreciation of
the adversary system. Each system puts the other in context, setting a baseline for comparison
and contrast of the representative features." STRIER, supra note 62, at 16.
108 As Strier has explained:
1 do not suggest wholesale adoption of the inquisitorial philosophy that a trial is a
vehicle for the implementation of state policy. Instead, 1 prescribe a departure from
our self-imposed enslavement to the principle that (except for the relatively rare jury
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Strier has proposed a "middle ground" approach to expanding the in
quisitorial role of the judge during trials involving attorneys in terms
familiar to those versed in the adversarial model:
To gain the benefits of independent, judicial questioning during trial,
we need not replace purely adversarial evidence gathering with the
judge-dominated model of the inquisitorial system. An acceptable
middle ground could be the same allocation of interrogating power
employed during our voir dire. . . . [T]he judge might conduct the
initial interrogation, after which the attorneys would be free to probe
for additional details. But the judge could always ask supplemental
questions which an incompetent or marginally competent attorney ne
glects to pose. The occasional need for this judicial "safety net" pro
tection escapes few who are familiar with adversary system trials.'®^

Adapting this more active role of the judge to hearings involving pro se
litigants could significantly assist the pro se litigant in developing the
factual record.
In addition, as noted above, pro se litigants also face a daunting
challenge in articulating a legal framework or theory of the case in
which the merits of their claim or defense can be e v a l u a t e d . T h u s , it
could be productive to adapt the approach in German civil actions in
which the "court's duty to discover the truth is matched by a cognate
responsibility to ascertain and apply the law without prompting Jrom the
parties. In essence, the court seeks to ensure a decision based on the
merits of the case.""^ Although this approach may seem at odds with
the judge's role within the adversary system,"^ it is not unlike the role
played by a judge in Small Claims court, who must not only apply sub
stantive law to the facts presented by the pro se parties, but must also
identify the substantive law to be applied to the facts since a Small
nullification) procedure is all-imporranr in trial and outcome is irrelevant. "We will
not compromise the integrity of our trial system if we occasionally drop the blindfold
of Justice to avert gross inequities. If we do not, if we continue to abide by a blind,
quasi-religious faith in adversary procedure, then the means to justice will have swal
lowed the ends.
Id. at 283.
109 Id. at 265.
110 See supra notes 72, 77, and 80.
111 STRIER, supra note 62, at 217 (emphasis added).
112 Id. (noting that "A contrary dynamic obtains in the adversary system. The general pre
mise of adversary procedure is that the court has no independent knowledge of the law and must
therefore be informed of it by argument.").
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Claims judge generally does not have the benefit of lawyers to brief the
law."^ Such an approach could be adapted to Housing Court proceed
ings. Of course, if such a responsibility is imposed on the Housing
Court judge, she must be provided both training in the substantive law
most regularly at issue in the proceedings before her,^''' and a sufficient
pool of court attorneys to assist in legal research and bench memos on
the matters before her.
Professor Moynihan summarizes some of the considerations sug
gested by the French inquisitorial model that could guide evaluation of
the advisability of incorporating other elements from such systems:
113 See Lebovits, supra note 57, at 9 (establishing that small claims judge is required to adhere
strictly to the requirements of substantive law and may not merely speculate or compromise
under the guise of doing substantial justice). Professor Siegel has inquired, in response to Judge
Lebovits' argument.
With no lawyers representing the parties . . . , we must ask how the substantive law
can be applied at all, much less 'strictly'. . . . [T]he requirement to apply the substan
tive law strictly when there are no attorneys present to argue the law would put on the
small claims judge the same duties imposed on a Court of Appeals judge to whom
talented and well paid attorneys argue the law in cases with high stakes, and for whom
two law clerks offer ready assistance and counsel.
SIEGEL, supra note 57, § 582, at 968. The answer to Professor Siegel's inquiry, I would submit,
is that the small claims juc^e must use whatever knowledge or assistance is at her disposal to
identify the substantive law applicable to the facts put before her by the pro se litigant or that
were developed by the judge. See Lebovits, supra note 57. Only by assuming that responsibility
can the small claims judge "do substantial justice . . . according to the rules of substantive law."
N.Y. CITY CIV. CT. ACT § 1804 (emphasis added). Indeed, The Small Claims Manual admon
ishes judges that this statutory requirement:
. . . serves as a clarion call to apply New York's hallowed statutory and common law,
lest the Small Claims forum develop a reputation for second-class justice that it has
heretofore resolutely avoided. ... [I]f the 'technical rule of law' is unclear. Judges
(even non-lawyer Town and Village Court justices) should do what they do when (or
would do if) sitting in other court parts: determine the rule of law as best they can, with
whatever review, research, and reflection are necessary.
ENGORON, supra note 57, at 41 (emphasis added).
A candidate for a Housing Court judgeship must "have been admitted to the bar of the
state for at least five years, two years of which shall have been in active practice." N. Y. CITY
CIV. CT ACT § llO(i). In addition, the candidate must also be "qualified by training, interest,
experience, judicial temperament and knowledge of federal, state and local housing laws and pro
grams. ..." Id.% 110(f) (emphasis added). These statutory requirements are intended, among
other things, to assure that a Housing Court judge has a sufficient level of knowledge and
possibly practice in substantive housing law. Accordingly, requiring such judges to identify and
apply applicable substantive law for pro se litigants does not present the Herculean challenge
feared by Professor Siegel. See supra note 113. However, these statutory qualifications for ap
pointment, and indeed for reappointment to the Housing Court bench, will have to be rigor
ously applied to ensure that persons sitting in Housing Court will be able to meet their
responsibility to assist pro se litigants in the manner proposed here.
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[We] might want to consider the French experience when it considers
the role that should be played by the housing court judge. The typical
French trial and a housing court case share many similarities. Limited
discovery is an obvious one. So is the summary or documentary na
ture of the proceeding. The questioning of those witnesses who need
to [be] called in the French trial can apparently be done by judges
without a loss of public confidence in judicial fairness.
The French system does assume a role for lawyers, but there are as
pects of the French process that might be used to improve the lot of
the pro se litigant. In fact, in many civil jurisdictions, the judge has a
duty to assist the parties in clarifying their positions on factual and
legal issues. In France, a judge may play such a role but it is not
mandatory. It has been noted that, in practice, "this effectively rescues
parties with poor counsel, reflecting the civil system s fundamental
prejudice favoring the application of substantive law to obtain a just
result rather than a reliance on technicalities and procedure that often
leads to an unjust resolution." However, in a decision, the judge may
include only those grounds and documents relied on or produced by
the parties that have been available for inspection to both parties.
Major debate has occurred about importing many aspects of the
French . . . procedure into common law traditions. . . . That debate
would provide a rich background against which [we] might consider
issues raised by suggestions that housing court judges roles be changed
to more closely resemble the role of judges in France."'

It should be noted that contrary to the concerns expressed by some
commentators,"^ adopting a more active, inquisitorial role for judges
need not compromise judicial impartiality and fairness. Judges in in
quisitorial systems engage in a mandated active role without a loss of
impartiality."^ Administrative law judges, who also develop the factual
record and determine which law is applicable to the cases before them,
do so without any loss of an appearance of fairness."® Accordingly,
115 Moynihan, supra note 101, at 8-9 (citation omitted).
116 See Engler, supra note 3, at 2023-24 (summarizing concerns about appearance of partial
ity if a judge assists a pro se litigant); see abo Litigants Struggle, supra note 6, at 42-44; see abo
STRIER, supra note 62, at 37 (summarizing impartiality concerns arising from a judge s taking a
more active role in fact finding).
117 Id. at 83-84, 266-67; but see LUBAN, supra note 99, at 99 (describing the dominance of
prosecutors over the examining magistrate in the pre-trial phase in the French criminal system)
(citing Tomlinson, supra note 101, at 150-64).
118 Engler, supra note 3, at 2018.
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such concerns should not preempt importing aspects of the inquisitorial
model.
III.

CONCLUSION

The proposals set forth above challenge our adversarial system's re
ceived traditions of judicial passivity and impartiality, narrowly under
stood. These traditions dramatically limit the role played by most
judges in New York City's Housing Court (and in most other courts) in
assuring access to justice for pro se litigants. The consequences of this
circumscription are devastating for a pro se litigant, particularly one who
feels compelled to litigate her case rather than accept a settlement that
she considers to be unfair or prejudicial. Warned by the court that she
will be subject to the same mystifying rules of evidence, trial procedure,
and motion practice as a trained attorney, she soon realizes that the
option of "going to trial" may forebode even worse consequences than
the settlement she is resisting. If she opts to press her defenses or claims
at a hearing or by a motion, she finds that the assistance provided to her
even by a judge sensitive to the challenges faced by a pro se litigant is
extremely limited in the strange land of our attorney-centric rule-bound
adversarial system. Although the judge may try to explain trial or mo
tion procedures, and to some extent relax evidentiary rules, or even al
low her to testify to a limited degree in narrative form, she is left to
figure out on her own when she has said enough to meet a legal stan
dard regarding which she is largely ignorant.
Accordingly, I have proposed, as have other commentators, a more
active, inquisitorial-based role for Housing Court judges. I submit that
most of the models of such judicial intervention outlined above can be
The precedents from small claims courts and administrative agencies serve as an im
portant reminder that impartiality does not require judges to be passive. Like other
judges, small claims judges must remain impartial. ALJs in Social Security, welfare,
and unemployment benefits cases must also remain impartial. Judges may therefore
be active in assisting unrepresented litigants without compromising their impartiality.

Id.

(citations omitted).
Even within the United States, the trial judge's passivity is unique among those serv
ing in formal dispute resolution roles. In administrative hearings . . . arbitrators play
an active role without the loss of impartiality. In collective bargaining, federal
mediators rescue legions of sessions from stalemate. And at the local and private
sector levels, conciliators of all kind successfully function as neutral but active thirdparty facilitators in quasi-judicial roles. Clearly, impartiality and passivity are not
necessarily corollaries.

STRIER, supra note 62, at 84.
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incorporated to some extent into the present adversarial system. How
ever, the constitutional infirmity of the present system, which denies
equal access to justice to most pro se litigants in Housing Court, i.e., to
the vast majority of tenants and to a not insignificant number of small
landlords, requires that we consider more far-reaching departures from
the received construction of judicial role. Thus, I submit that at least
two additional reforms, which may require statutory, administrative,
and ethical reforms, are required: (1) jettisoning, in whole or in part,
evidentiary rules; and (2) placing an affirmative duty on the judge to
develop the factual record and to determine and apply relevant substan
tive law.
To some judges, lawyers, and commentators, such a transformation
challenges their very notion of what constitutes a legal system and the
role of a judge within such a system. Some may perceive the forum that
may result from these proposals as nothing more than a delegalized dis
pute resolution center overseen by a problem solver, not a court of law
presided over by a judge. However, I agree with Professor Goldschmidt
that:
[t]he delegalization proposed here consists of eliminating the secrecy
regarding basic legal information, such as the elements of causes of
action, and relaxing the rules of procedure and evidence. These do
not effect changes in substantive law, only in the fairness of the pro
ceedings for all litigants. Even if proceedings under these proposals
turn out to be, in one commentator's words, "litigation lite" for pro se
litigants and their adversaries, that is better than unfair litigation or no
access to justice at all.^^^

Indeed, one might note that in spite of the efforts of dedicated and wellintentioned judges and administrators, and in spite of recent Housing
Court reforms, the current system can hardly be called a law-based sys
tem. An adversarial system in which one of the contestants enters the
arena without arms or even armor, or in which she is given at best sec
ond-rate weapons, but no training on how to use even such inferior
tools, bespeaks a system in which the powerful survive, irrespective of
the demands and protections of substantive law. If a judge passively
presides over such unequal combat, acquiescing to and enforcing its re
sults, she reduces herself to being no more than a spectator to the pro119 Litigant's Struggle, supra note 6, at 53-54 (internal citations omitted).
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ceedings, rather than functioning as a neutral arbiter of facts and a
dispenser of justice. The proposals developed in this paper attempt to
find interventions by which a judge can assist the parties in presenting
to her both the nature of the legal conflict and the facts she needs to
adjudicate that conflict based on applicable substantive law. In that
way, a judge can more truly be said to be a person who is presiding over
a system ruled by law and not by the accidents of status or legal
representation.
Implementation of these proposals will not be easy. At a mini
mum, judges must be trained in the methods described above which are
permissible within the present system and encouraged (or perhaps even
persuaded) to apply them in their courtrooms. In addition, it is essen
tial that experimental pro se parts be established in which to test the
proposals set forth here. Those judicial interventions proposed above
that do not require statutory or other changes to be implemented would
be used in all matters sent to those parts. Those interventions that do
require such changes could be used where the parties consent to their
usage. The workings of the patts should be observed, documented, and
evaluated. The resulting experience-based conclusions would provide a
rationale for replacing or refining the methodologies used, and for devel
oping further interventions.
Whether or not the court system opts to adopt any of the proposals
set forth in this paper, it must recognize the challenge thrust upon it by
the large numbers of pro se litigants in the Housing Court, and identify
and implement some forms of judicial intervention to meet that chal
lenge. If it fails to do so, it will have failed in its fundamental constitu
tional and judicial task of assuring access to justice to pro se litigants in
New York City's Housing Court.

